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Abstract 
 
  
National soccer teams are currently ranked by soccer’s governing body, the 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).  Although the system used by 
FIFA is thorough, taking into account many different factors, many of the weights used in 
the system’s calculations are somewhat arbitrary.  It is investigated here how the use of a 
statistical model might better compare the teams for ranking purposes.  By treating each 
game played as a pairwise comparison experiment and by using the Bradley-Terry model 
as a starting point some suitable models are presented.  A key component of the final model 
introduced here its ability to differentiate between friendly matches and competitive 
matches when determining the impact of a match on a teams ranking. Posterior 
distributions of the rating parameters are obtained, and the rankings and results obtained 
from each model are compared to FIFA’s rankings and each other. 
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Introduction 
  
In the world of professional soccer, there is one governing body that determines all rules, 
and rankings, called the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).  The FIFA 
rankings system, developed by FIFA and Coca Cola allows for published rankings of all senior 
national teams.  The rankings are based on a number of criteria including match outcome, date of 
match, type of match, home field advantage, the number of goals scored, and points for regional 
strength of the competing teams.  For each match, the two competing teams each earn a score 
based on the aforementioned criteria.  A teams ranking is based on its cumulative score from all 
games during the ranking time period, which dates back to the previous eight years.   
 The scoring is done as follows: 
 
1. The winning team is awarded points, based on the strength of the team         
that they beat. 
2. Each team is awarded points based on the number of goals scored, with the 
more weight attached to the first goal scored rather than the subsequent ones, 
in order to avoid overweighting of goals. 
3. To account for home field advantage, the away team is awarded a small bonus 
of three points. 
4. To account for the importance of the game, an arbitrary weighting is assigned 
to each type of game as follows: 
• Friendly match x 1.00  
• Continental championship preliminary x 1.50  
• World Cup preliminary match x 1.50  
• Continental championship finals match x 1.75  
• FIFA Confederations Cup match x 1.75  
• World Cup finals match x 2.00  
5. If two strong teams from the same continent play each other, than a weighting 
based on which confederation they are a part of is used.  For two strong teams 
from different continents, the average weighting for each teams respective 
confederation is used.  The weights are as follows: 
• UEFA x 1.00  
• CONMEBOL x 0.99  
• CAF x 0.94  
• CONCACAF x 0.94  
 4 
• AFC x 0.93  
• OFC x 0.93  
6. Last, FIFA considers all games played for the previous eight years, and 
arbitrarily weights the games based on when it was played with the following 
system(from 2003): 
• + previous year (2002) : 7/8 value  
• + previous year (2001) : 6/8 value  
• + previous year (2000) : 5/8 value  
• + previous year (1999) : 4/8 value  
• + previous year (1998) : 3/8 value  
• + previous year (1997) : 2/8 value  
• + previous year (1996) : 1/8 value  
 
In addition to the above, FIFA only uses each teams 7 best results each year, so that 
teams  cannot improve in the rankings by simply playing an excessive number of games.  To see 
how this works, consider an example.  Suppose a team plays twelve games in a year, their score 
for that year would be calculated as follows: 
• The best seven of the 12 results are identified  
• The total score for these seven matches is calculated (X)  
• The total score for all 12 matches is calculated  
• This total is divided by 12 and multiplied by seven (Y)  
• The total for the seven best results is added to the seven "average" results 
(X+Y)  
• This total (X+Y) is divided by two for the final score 
The FIFA rankings of all teams considered in this project can be found in Appendix A. 
While this system is very thorough; all of the weights used in the ranking process are arbitrary 
chosen.  Thus a statistical model that could take certain criteria and use it to compare teams in a 
non – arbitrary manner would be useful. 
When teams are being compared with one another based on certain characteristics, this is 
called a paired comparison design (Wilkinson, 1957).   In practice, the Bradley-Terry model has 
often been used for paired comparisons designs used to rank sports teams in the past (Knorr – 
Held, 1999 and Glickman, 1993). The goal of this project was to develop a less arbitrary system 
 5 
to rank national soccer teams, and the Bradley-Terry model is a good starting point for 
achieving this goal. 
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Chapter 1:  The Model 
  
In order to compare soccer teams, certain criteria are necessary.  The results from each 
game clearly would be the most important criteria, but there are other criteria, such as home – 
field advantage, what type of game is being played, and a team’s ability to get better or worse 
over time that also can not be ignored.  In building a model to incorporate all these criteria, there 
has to be a starting point, and the Bradley – Terry model, which compares teams based on wins 
and losses only, will be used to serve this function.   This chapter describes the methodology 
behind the Bradley – Terry model, and how it can be extended to incorporate the desired criteria 
listed above, which will eventually lead to the final model.   Some of the extensions to the 
Bradley – Terry model discussed here have been previously implemented (see Glickman, 1993).  
However, the extension of the Bradley – Terry model to rank teams using different types of 
games is an original idea.  
 
 
1.1:  The General Bradley – Terry Model 
 
The Bradley – Terry model was first introduced by Ralph Bradley and Milton Terry in 
their 1952 paper, Rank Analysis of Incomplete Block Designs I:  The Method of Paired 
Comparisons.  In its most basic form, the Bradley-Terry model assumes that: 
 
ji
i
ijp pipi
pi
+
=
,    (1) 
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where pij denotes the probability that team i defeats team j, and pii and pij are parameters 
representing player strengths or abilities.  It is trivial to see that pij + pji = 1, and thus the model 
only accepts one of two possible outcomes:  team i wins, or team j wins.  One derivation of this 
model can be found in Glickman(1993).  The model assumes that when team i competes, it 
produces a “score”, Si.  This score is unobserved, and considered independent of the opposing 
team’s “score”, Sj.  The observed variable is the result of the game, which is determined by the 
larger of the two scores.  Si follows an extreme value distribution with location parameter (the 
parameter that describes the location of the distribution) log pii (Gumbel, 1961).  Thus, the 
cumulative distribution function of iS , )(sFi  is of the form 
 
    )exp()( )log( isi esF pi−−−= ,  
 
and it follows that the difference, Si – Sj follows a logistic distribution with mean log pii  - log pij : 
 
))log(log(1
1)(~
jisiji e
sFSS
pipi −−−
+
=− . 
 
Therefore, using the properties of the cdf it is implied that 
 
 
ji
i
j
i
j
i
jiji ji
ji
ji e
e
e
SSPSS
pipi
pi
pi
pi
pi
pi
pipi
pipi
pipi +
=








+








=
+
=
+
−=>−=>
−
−
−−−
1
11
11)0()Pr( )log(log
)log(log
))log(log0( , 
which is now in the form originally stated.   
 
 Now consider that teams i and j compete a total of nij times with team i winning yij times 
and team j winning nij - yij = yji times.  Then, if pi = (pi1, pi2,…., pip), the distribution of y = (yij, i,j = 
1, 2, …….., p) is multinomial with with probability pij and density 
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f(y| pi ) =
jiij y
ji
j
y
ji ji
i
ij
ij
y
n








+







+




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< pipi
pi
pipi
pi
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Now, it follows that the likelihood for pi, given the data can now be written 
   L(pi| y) ∏
∏
<
=
+
∝
ji
n
ji
p
i
y
i
ij
i
)(
1
pipi
pi
, 
 
where ∑
=
=
p
j
iji yy
1
.  The likelihood of pi is a function which describes the amount of support 
given to particular values of pi by the data.  In other worlds, if L(pi1| y) > L(pi2| y) then the data 
gives more support to pi1 being the true value of pi than it does to pi2.  Thus, maximizing this 
likelihood with respect to pi will give a “best” estimate in the sense that the data supports it more 
than all other values of pi. The estimates resulting from maximizing the likelihood are called 
Maximum Likelihood Esimates (MLE’s).  
If the likelihood for a parameter depends on the data only through the value of a summary 
statistic, that statistic is called a sufficient statistic.  Thus, it clearly follows that given nij, yij are 
sufficient statistics for pii, and so only the number of times that each team beat all the other teams 
in the model are needed to estimate pi. 
 
This model can be viewed in the Bayesian context as well.  Bayesian data analysis 
assumes that the parameters come from a distribution instead of the assumption that they are 
simply values.  The parameters are given a prior distribution and that distribution is combined 
with the data to produce a posterior distribution, from which inference on the parameters can be 
made.  Thus by using Bayesian data analysis instead of conventional analysis, we will gain more 
information about each of the parameters of interest.  The Bayesian model used here is from 
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Leonard (1977).  First, consider the model established in (1), and let ii piα log= and place a 
multivariate normal prior distribution on α with mean vector µ and non singular covariance 
matrix C.  Reparametrizing the model in terms of αi (the team’s “rating”) gives 
 
    ji
i
ee
epij αα
α
+
=
.    (2) 
 
The implementation of this model is relatively simple.  Before the games are played, the 
αi’s are assumed to have a normal prior distribution.  When games are played, the likelihood is 
used to obtain parameter estimates, and these updated estimates are used as the prior parameters 
for the next games played.  This process continues until the parameter estimates converge to 
certain values.  If a team has yet to compete, a large prior variance can be used to show the 
uncertainty of the team’s rating. 
 
 
 
1.2:  Ties 
 
Any model used to rank soccer teams will obviously need to be able to handle tied game 
results.  Davidson (1970) proposed the following extension to the Bradley-Terry model to handle 
tied games: 
 
 
=1ijp Pr(i defeats j|θ) = )(
2
1
jiji
i
eee
e
ααδαα
α
++
++
 
 
=2ijp Pr(j defeats i|θ) = )(
2
1
jiji
j
eee
e
ααδαα
α
++
++
  (3) 
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=3ijp Pr(i ties with j|θ) = )(21
)(
2
1
jiji
ji
eee
e
ααδαα
ααδ
++
++
++
, 
 
where the parameter δ measures the effect of ties.  Now the model considers three possibilities:  
a win, a loss, or a tie. Consider how δ affects the model.  Large positive values of δ will imply 
that there is a high probability of ties, since 3ijp will be larger for large values of δ.  Large 
negative values of δ will imply a small probability of ties, since 3ijp will be small for large 
negative values of δ.  In the case that δ is close to zero, this will imply that there the probabilities 
of a win, loss, or tie are about equal subject to the team strengths.  In the Bayesian context, δ has 
to be given a prior distribution.  Since there is no prior information on how ties affect the model, 
a vague prior is given.  The prior distribution on δ is a normal distribution with mean zero and a 
large variance, to reflect the lack of knowledge about it. Now, with the inclusion of ties, the 
model is beginning to look more suitable for modeling the situation of interest to us. 
  
 
 
1.3:  Inclusion of Other Parameters in the Model 
 
 The model established in the previous section is an improvement over the general 
Bradley - Terry model, but still does not account for a few important factors in ranking soccer 
teams.  For one, home field advantage is very important in soccer and can not be overlooked.   A 
team playing in its own country should have a big advantage over the team they are playing.  
Hence an extension of the model in (3), also proposed by Davidson(1970) is given by 
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=1ijp Pr(i defeats j|θ) = )(
2
1 ηααδηαα
α
++++
++
jiji
i
eee
e
 
 
=2ijp Pr(j defeats i|θ) = )(
2
1 ηααδηαα
ηα
++++
+
++
jiji
j
eee
e
                             (4) 
 
 
=3ijp Pr(i ties with j|θ) = )(
2
1
)(
2
1
ηααδηαα
ηααδ
++++
+++
++
jiji
ji
eee
e
, 
 
where η determines the relative home field advantage (note that it should be negative if it gives 
the home team an advantage, because it will decrease the probability of team j, the road team 
winning). 
 
Let yijk, k = 1, 2, 3 be the data representing the number of wins losses and ties for team i 
in games with team j for which team i was the home team and let nij be the total number of 
games played between teams i and j.  The yijk’s are just counts of wins, losses, and ties. Now 
consider the parameter ijkijijk pn ⋅=µ , which is the total number of games played between teams 
i and j multiplied by the probability that team i defeats team j.  This parameter should be a good 
representation of the number of times that team i defeats team j.  Thus, yijk can be modeled as a 
Poisson random variable with mean .ijkµ   Also consider .ijkµ   The logarithm of ijkµ  can be 
equated to a linear predictor: 
 
ijiijij An −+= αµ )log()log( 1  
 
   ijjijij An −++= γαµ )log()log( 2  
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   ijjiijij An −++++= γααδµ 2
1
2
1
2
1)log()log( 3 ,  
 
where Aij is the logarithm of the denominator in the pijk’s.  Thus, now the model described in this 
section (and the model in (3)) can be parameterized as a Poisson generalized linear model with a 
logarithmic link.  The Aij term serves as a nuisance parameter, in that it is in the model to ensure 
that yij1 + yij2 + yij3 = nij, however it will not be sampled from the posterior distribution since it is 
not of interest.  It should also be noted that this model is over parameterized, so one of the αi 
should be set to zero. 
 
 Two other important factors that go into ranking teams are whether or not the game was 
played at a neutral site and what type of game was played.  For example, a win in a friendly 
match should not count towards a teams’ “rating” as much as a win in a world cup match.  While 
the models in the previous sections have all been used before, this idea of including game type as 
a parameter is a new concept that could potentially have a significant contribution to the model.  
Similarly, if a team is playing in its own country instead of a neutral site, it should have a higher 
probability of winning the game. Thus, the model has to be extended to include game type and 
games at neutral sites.  For this project, two game types were considered: friendly matches and 
competitive matches.  The model to include these ideas can be seen by 
 
 
=1ijhmp Pr(i defeats j|θ) = ))1((2
1
)1( ηααδηαα
α
−+′+′+
−+′′
′
++
hh jmimjmim
im
eee
e
 
 
=2ijhmp Pr(j defeats i|θ) = ))1((
2
1
)1(
)1(
ηααδηαα
ηα
−+′+′+
−+′′
−+′
++
hh
h
jmimjmim
jm
eee
e
                     (5) 
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=3ijhmp Pr(i ties with j|θ) = ))1((
2
1
)1(
))1((
2
1
ηααδηαα
ηααδ
−+′+′+
−+′′
−+′+′+
++
hh
h
jmimjmim
jmim
eee
e
, 
 
 
where  αim′ = λm αi  so that only a fraction of the team’s true “rating” parameter actually 
contributes to the probabilities.  For competitive matches, λm = 1 so that αim′ = αi and the team’s 
full parameter will only be included in the model.  .  For friendly matches the data will determine 
λm, which should estimate the weight that friendly matches take on relative to competitive 
matches.  
 Multiplying (h - 1) by η allows the model to account for games played at a neutral site.  
The (h – 1) term works like an indicator variable in that when h = 1 (neutral games), the home 
field advantage parameter, η will not be in the model, whereas when h = 2 (team i is the home 
team), the home field advantage parameter will be in the model.  Thus, this “indicator” method 
allows the model to consider games in which there is no home team. 
 In the Bayesian context, prior distributions need to be assigned to the home – field 
advantage and game type parameters.  Since there is no information about the home – field 
advantage parameter, and it can be positive or negative, the same prior distribution as the tie 
parameter is assigned, a normal distribution with mean zero and large variance.  For the game 
type parameter however, there is some prior information.  It must be greater than zero because it 
represents the weight that friendly matches contribute relative to competitive matches.  Thus, a 
beta prior distribution was assigned to ensure that it was greater than zero.  Since there is no 
other information about the parameter, a vague beta distribution was assigned to the game type 
parameter, )1,1(~ betamλ , for m = 1 (friendly matches). 
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1.4:  A Dynamic Model 
 
 The model developed in this section can also be used with dynamic parameters (see 
Glickman, 1993).  Similar to the reparameterized Bayesian Bradley – Terry model, let pijt be the 
probability that team i defeats team j during time period t.  So, like the model in (2),  
 
jtit
it
ee
epijt αα
α
+
= ,    (6) 
 
where αit is team i’s rating in time period t.  Now team ratings progress over time following an 
AR(1) model with φ = 1: 
 
     αit = αi(t-1) + wt, 
 
where wt is the amount that team strengths change from time period t – 1 to time period t.  wt is 
assumed to be stochastically independent of αi(t-1), and  
 
    wt | σ2 ~ N(γt, σ2Ip), 
 
where γt is the mean amount by which teams change between time periods t – 1 and t, and σ2 is 
the variance of the change that occurs between time periods.  An initial prior distribution on α1 
must be specified, 
 
    α
 1 ~ N(µ1, C1),  
 
where µ1 and  C1 are p – dimensional (for the number of teams).  A gamma prior distribution was 
placed on the precision, 2
1
σ
ω = , as it is the conjugate prior distribution for precision: 
 
    
ωωω 00 1 ba e−∝ ,  
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  where a0 and b0 are specified in advance.  This system will now show how the Bradley – 
Terry ratings change over time.  The model used for this paper defines γt = 0 for all t, thus 
making wt follow a random walk model. 
 
The dynamic Bayesian analysis of the extended Bradley – Terry model to include ties, 
home – field advantage, and game type follows the same methodology as that of the previous 
Bradley – Terry model, where now the model describes probabilities at a given time period,  
 
=tijhmp 1 Pr(i defeats j at time t|θ) = ))1((
2
1
)1( ηααδηαα
α
−+′+′+
−+′′
′
++
hh jtmtimjtmitm
itm
eee
e
 
 
=tijhmp 2 Pr(j defeats i at time t |θ) = ))1((
2
1
)1(
)1(
ηααδηαα
ηα
−+′+′+
−+′′
−+′
++
hh
h
jtmitmjtmitm
jtm
eee
e
     (7) 
 
=tijhmp 3 Pr(i ties with j at time t |θ) = ))1((21)1(
))1((
2
1
ηααδηαα
ηααδ
−+′+′+
−+′′
−+′+′+
++
hh
h
jtmitmjtmitm
jtmitm
eee
e
. 
 
The prior distribution of all the parameters is the same as described previously,  
 
   (γ1, δ, η) ~ N(µ1, C1) 
 
    )1,1(~ betaλ , 
 
where µ1 and  C1 are now (p + 2) dimensional, and the precision between time periods follows 
the gamma prior distributions specified previously.  Now the model is finalized, and the analysis 
can be conducted. 
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Chapter 2:  The Data 
 
  
For the general Bradley-Terry model in (1), the data had to be entered in the form: 
 
yij = 1, if team i beats team j. 
yij = -1, if team j beats team i. 
 
 Notice that the data for this model can not take ties into account, as there are only two 
possible values for the data, so ties were thrown out of the data set for this model.  The data was 
obtained from FIFA’s website, www.fifa.com.   
 For the model with ties, and all models including ties, the data had to be entered in the 
form: 
yij1 = the number of wins team i had against team j. 
yij2 = the number of wins team j had against team i. 
yij3 = the number of ties between team i and team j. 
 
  Data from over 2,300 games from the past ten years was collected and separated 
based on time period, home field advantage, and game type.  For the final model, the following 
data had been collected: 
 
- Wins, Losses, and Ties between all teams in competitive games for which there was a 
home team, in T different time periods. 
- Wins, Losses, and Ties between all teams in competitive games for which there was not 
a home team, in T different time periods. 
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- Wins, Losses, and Ties between all teams in friendly matches for which there was a 
home team, in T different time periods. 
- Wins, Losses, and Ties between all teams in friendly matches for which there was not a 
home team, in T different time periods. 
 
T represents the number of different time periods considered in the model, and thus all 
games in all time periods under all possible circumstances in the model are accounted for. 
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Chapter 3:  The Model for Soccer Data 
 
 
 The final model, established in section 2.4 is used for the soccer data described in 
Chapter 3.  It has been tailored to describe the data as it will be seen in the following section. The 
model for soccer data can be specified as 
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where, 
 i = 1, 2, …., 158 for the 158 teams considered in the model. 
j = 1, 2, …., 158. 
           h = 1, 2 (1 for when i is home team, 2 for when there is no home team). 
           m = 1,2 (1 for friendly matches, 2 for competitive matches). 
           t = 1, 2, …, T + 1 (corresponding to each of the T time periods considered),  
 
and where  αitm′ = λm αit and αit = αi(t-1) + wt, 
 
where wt | σ2 ~ N(0, σ2Ip).  The prior distributions for  γ1, δ, η, and λ are as follows: 
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  γ1 ~ N(0, σ2Ip), 
 
(δ, η) ~ N(0, 1000*I2),  
 
λ ~ beta(1,1), and 
 
ωω
σ
ω 00 12
1 ba
e
−
∝= . 
 
 
Notice that only T time periods are considered, but there are T + 1 values of t.  This is 
due to the random walk assumption on αt, because α1 must be simulated before applying the 
random walk to α2.  Thus, t = 2 corresponds to the time period.  Now, the model can be applied to 
the soccer data, and the ranking system can be tested.  The program used to run the model was 
Winbugs, a sophisticated statistics program which uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods and is particularly helpful with Bayesian data analysis.  The code for each of the models 
in the results section can be found in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 4:  Results and Convergence 
 
 
We wanted to compare the results we obtained from the model as we made it more 
complex, so the rankings and statistics produced by each model will be presented, along with the 
FIFA rankings for the top twenty teams in each ranking system.  In addition, a trace of the 
posterior samples for certain parameters will be presented to show that the parameters are 
converging, which is important because the inference made on the posterior distributions in not 
valid unless convergence is met.  
For all models, the number of samples to be burned (were thrown out before calculations 
on the samples began) had to be determined.  The method used to determine this involved 
burning 4000, 5000, and 6000 samples and comparing parameter estimates and a fit statistic 
called the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC).  The reason that the smallest number of burned 
samples is 4000 is that WinBugs would not allow any less.  If the parameter estimates and the 
DIC do not change by more burning more samples, then there is strong evidence that 
convergence is being reached.  For example, Table 1 shows the some of the parameter estimates 
of 5000 iterations after burning 4000, 5000, and 6000 samples respectively, along with the DIC 
for the model including only ties and home – field advantage.   
 
 
node  mean - 4000  mean - 5000  mean - 6000 
Brazil 0.7535 0.7576 0.7591 
England 0.5456 0.5452 0.5475 
USA 0.526 0.5198 0.5265 
home -0.4599 -0.4599 -0.4594 
tie -0.08565 -0.08676 -0.08739 
DIC 10021.1 10022.2 10021.4 
Table 1:  Burn – In Convergence of Parameters 
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 It can be seen that neither the parameters nor the DIC changes as a result of burning 
more samples.  Thus, it can be concluded that the parameters are converging by 4000 burns, and 
it is only necessary to burn 4000 samples.  This method of finding convergence was done for all 
models, and 4000 samples proved to be enough for all models used in this project.  In each 
section, figures depicting selected parameter’s history and density will be given as further proof 
of convergence. 
 
 
 
5.1:  General Bradley – Terry Model 
 
 The general Bradley – Terry model which is a simple pairwise comparison model 
assuming that all games played, at all times carry equal weight.  In other words, a Friendly match 
played eight years ago contributes exactly as much as a World Cup match played within the past 
few years.  It also assumes no ties, so one team must win and one team must lose.  Thus, all the 
games for which ties occurred were not counted.  The results for the this model were not 
expected to be that close to FIFA’s rankings, because of the complexity of FIFA’s rankings and 
the simplicity of this model.  The results (of the top 20 teams) are displayed in Table 2, and the 
rankings compared to those of FIFA are displayed in Table 3. 
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Team mean sd MC_error Ratio val2.5pc median val97.5pc 
Brazil 0.962 0.2026 0.0022 0.010859 0.5698 0.9599 1.363 
France 0.6843 0.2384 0.00271 0.011367 0.2187 0.6846 1.153 
Mexico 0.6128 0.2054 0.002428 0.011821 0.2146 0.6133 1.014 
Japan 0.4144 0.2265 0.002431 0.010733 -0.02844 0.4128 0.8635 
Nigeria 0.4132 0.2382 0.002304 0.009673 -0.0628 0.4136 0.8743 
Argentina 0.3962 0.2338 0.002345 0.01003 -0.06315 0.396 0.8616 
Netherlands 0.3936 0.2595 0.002635 0.010154 -0.1041 0.3951 0.8978 
Australia 0.3859 0.2448 0.002425 0.009906 -0.08624 0.3859 0.8772 
Germany 0.372 0.2336 0.002273 0.00973 -0.08214 0.3716 0.8362 
Spain 0.3698 0.2616 0.00273 0.010436 -0.1512 0.3693 0.8856 
USA 0.3645 0.2106 0.002148 0.010199 -0.04502 0.3611 0.7808 
Iran 0.3338 0.2616 0.002752 0.01052 -0.1746 0.3338 0.8438 
Italy 0.33 0.2579 0.002442 0.009469 -0.175 0.3335 0.8311 
Norway 0.279 0.2826 0.002763 0.009777 -0.2745 0.2787 0.8245 
Egypt 0.2768 0.2481 0.002861 0.011532 -0.2012 0.2764 0.7673 
Colombia 0.2562 0.224 0.002274 0.010152 -0.1831 0.2569 0.7007 
England 0.2313 0.2612 0.00259 0.009916 -0.2813 0.2328 0.746 
Croatia 0.2201 0.2544 0.002626 0.010322 -0.2809 0.22 0.7164 
Cameroon 0.2137 0.2435 0.002744 0.011269 -0.2692 0.2131 0.6926 
Portugal 0.2097 0.2588 0.002388 0.009227 -0.3004 0.2072 0.7261 
Table 2:  Results From General BT Model 
 
 
 
 
Rank Team - Model Ranking Team - FIFA Ranking 
1 Brazil  Brazil 
2 France  France 
3 Mexico  Argentina 
4 Japan  Czech Republic 
5 Nigeria  Spain 
6 Argentina  Netherlands 
7 Netherlands  Mexico 
8 Australia  England 
9 Germany  Portugal 
10 Spain  Italy 
11 USA  USA 
12 Iran Ireland 
13 Italy  Sweden 
14 Norway  Denmark 
15 Egypt  Turkey 
16 Colombia  Uruguay 
17 England  Japan 
18 Croatia  Greece 
19 Cameroon  Germany 
20 Portugal  Iran 
Table 3:  General BT Model Rankings Compared with FIFA 
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The top two teams are the same for both, however there are some teams in the model’s 
top twenty teams that FIFA, and general knowledge say probably are not correct.  Three teams in 
particular stand out:  Australia, Norway, and Egypt.  Australia, is ranked 57th by FIFA, a large 
differential from the 8th that they are ranked by the model.  Norway and Egypt, ranked 14th and 
15th by the model are ranked 35th and 34th respectively by FIFA.  Thus, as would be expected 
from this model which has very simple assumptions, the rankings produced are not good. 
 
These results are based on the assumption that the parameters are converging.  Evidence 
of this was produced in the previous section in Table 1.  In addition, a method for determining if 
convergence is failing is to compare the MCMC error to the standard error of the parameter.  If 
the ratio of the MCMC error to the posterior standard error of the parameter exceeds 5%, failure 
of convergence is indicated (Conroy, et al., 2005).  Note that this value is included in the Table 2 
under the column labeled ratio (and will be included in the following sections as well).  A trace 
of the parameter history and their posterior densities would only further evidence of 
convergence.  A trace of the top two teams and their posterior densities are presented in Figures 
1 and 2.  This will be done in each section to further the evidence that each model is converging. 
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Figure 1:  Trace of Parameters for Bradley - Terry Model 
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Figure 2:  Smoothed Kernel Densities for Bradley - Terry Model (s = .15) 
 
 
 The trace of each parameter definitely appears to be stationary and the densities both 
clearly appear to follow a normal density centered at their respective mean (.9620 for Brazil and 
.6843 for France).  Thus, there is enough evidence that the parameters in the model are 
converging, and the results can thus be accepted.  However, as stated previously the results are 
not great because of the very simple model assumptions. 
 
 
 
5.2:  Extended Bradley – Terry Model with Ties and Home – Field 
Advantage 
 
 The extended Bradley – Terry model to include ties and home – field advantage should 
produce better results than the previous model because it now includes some of the aspects that 
are very important in soccer.  Allowing for the possibility of ties is something that any soccer 
model must have if it is to be considered credible and home – field advantage seems as if it 
would be more important in soccer than it would be in other sports, simply because of the 
importance attached to soccer in most countries around the world.   
The model is still not complete, as it does not address many important issues important to 
soccer.  It still considers all games played at any time to be equally weighted, and it does not 
account for the fact that not all types of games are equally weighted as well.  In addition, the 
manner in which the model addresses home – field advantage is very simple, in that it assumes 
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there is a home team in every game played, which is clearly not the case, with a majority of 
international games being played at neutral sites.  With that said, the results should still show 
improvement over those from section 5.1.   
 The results for the top twenty teams with the tie and Home – Field Advantage Parameter 
from the model (4), with 4000 burn – in iterations and a sample size of 6000 are displayed in 
Table 4, and the rankings compared with those from FIFA are displayed in Table 5.  The Monte 
Carlo errors are very small again and the standard errors are also fairly constant.  Notice that the 
home parameter is negative, as it should be if the home team has an advantage (this was 
explained in section 1.3).  It is also very large in magnitude, as it is larger than most of the 
team’s parameter estimates.  This implies that home – field advantage is very important, and in 
most cases, more important than the teams playing.  To see this, consider a game played by 
England and the USA.  If the game is played in England,  
 
   Pr(England Wins) = .4272 
   Pr(USA Wins) = .2644 
   Pr(Tie) = .3083, 
 
whereas if the game is played in the United States,  
 
   Pr(England Wins) = .2706 
   Pr(USA Wins) = .4202 
   Pr(Tie) = .3093. 
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So between these two teams, the probability of the road team winning is less than the 
probability of tie, and each team’s probability of winning largely depends on where the game is 
played.  Thus, under this model, home – field advantage is very influential in predicting the 
probabilities of a win, a loss, and a tie.  The tie parameter is also negative, which implies that a 
tie is less likely to occur than a win or a loss.  Its magnitude is relatively small however, so it is 
not that much less likely.  Also, the standard errors for the tie and home – field advantage 
parameters are very small, meaning that narrow credible intervals are obtained for these 
parameters and more confidence can be had in these estimates than the team parameter estimates. 
 
 
Team mean sd MC error Ratio 2.50% median 97.50% 
Brazil 0.7535 0.179 0.005115 0.028575 0.3995 0.7521 1.095 
Mexico 0.6974 0.1793 0.005432 0.030296 0.3556 0.7002 1.05 
France 0.6874 0.2239 0.006077 0.027142 0.2556 0.6746 1.117 
Spain 0.6808 0.2359 0.007182 0.030445 0.217 0.682 1.138 
Italy 0.6513 0.2269 0.007164 0.031573 0.2185 0.65 1.095 
Germany 0.6134 0.2161 0.006022 0.027867 0.2211 0.6036 1.051 
Argentina 0.581 0.2031 0.006347 0.031251 0.1678 0.5811 0.9721 
Netherlands 0.5621 0.2383 0.006506 0.027302 0.08817 0.5739 1.024 
Denmark 0.5485 0.2173 0.006488 0.029857 0.1287 0.5468 0.9672 
Iran 0.5485 0.2257 0.006915 0.030638 0.1058 0.5504 0.9852 
Nigeria 0.5467 0.2289 0.006699 0.029266 0.08978 0.5466 0.9944 
England 0.5447 0.2306 0.006209 0.026925 0.07717 0.5574 0.9932 
Japan 0.5337 0.2085 0.005411 0.025952 0.1333 0.5342 0.9729 
Sweden 0.5288 0.2382 0.006197 0.026016 0.07951 0.5264 0.983 
USA 0.5249 0.2062 0.006134 0.029748 0.1248 0.5245 0.9396 
Croatia 0.4887 0.2334 0.007019 0.030073 0.04289 0.4823 0.9619 
Czech Republic 0.4589 0.2344 0.005861 0.025004 0.01398 0.4662 0.9088 
Costa Rica 0.4222 0.207 0.006388 0.03086 0.01121 0.4235 0.8268 
Ireland 0.4095 0.2416 0.007304 0.030232 -0.07726 0.4106 0.8978 
Australia 0.3958 0.2335 0.006442 0.027589 -0.1064 0.3985 0.846 
home -0.4599 0.04332 0.001242 0.02867 -0.5435 -0.46 -0.3766 
tie -0.08635 0.03939 0.001015 0.025768 -0.165 -0.08508 -0.01021 
Table 4:  Results for BT Model with Ties and HFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
Rank Team - Model Ranking Team - FIFA Ranking 
1 Brazil  Brazil 
2 Mexico  France 
3 France  Argentina 
4 Spain  Czech Republic 
5 Italy  Spain 
6 Germany  Netherlands 
7 Argentina  Mexico 
8 Netherlands  England 
9 Denmark  Portugal 
10 Iran  Italy 
11 Nigeria  USA 
12 England Ireland 
13 Japan  Sweden 
14 Sweden  Denmark 
14 USA  Turkey 
16 Croatia  Uruguay 
17 Czech Republic  Japan 
18 Costa Rica  Greece 
19 Ireland  Germany 
20 Australia  Iran 
Table 5:  BT Model with Ties and HFA Rankings Compared with FIFA 
 
 
 The rankings are closer to FIFA’s rankings than the rankings from section 5.1.  Like the 
rankings from section 5.1, most of the teams at the top of the rankings are there for both ranking 
systems.  However, the teams that differ do not differ as much under this model.  Of the teams 
that are in the top twenty in the for the model that do not appear in FIFA’s top twenty, Nigeria, 
Croatia, and Costa Rica are all in FIFA’s top thirty teams, which is not a glaring difference.  
However there are still some large differences between the rankings.  Australia is again in the top 
twenty, however they move down 13 spots under the new model.  Since the home – field 
advantage parameter was added to the model, this probably implies that Australia won a lot of 
their games at home.  Under the old model, these wins would only have added to their parameter 
strength, but under the new model each home win adds to the home – field advantage parameter 
as well. Uruguay and Greece, who are in FIFA’s top twenty are ranked 41st and 46th respectively 
by the model.  The model still contains some simple assumptions, so the rankings are not 
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expected to be great yet, however clear improvements can be seen by the addition of the ties 
and home – field advantage to the model. 
 
 As stated in the previous section, these results are under the assumption that the 
parameters converge.  Again, evidence of convergence was found by burning 4000, 5000, and 
6000 samples and noting that the parameter estimates and DIC did not change based on the 
number of burns.  Also, the ratio of MCMC error to posterior standard error of parameters does 
not exceed 5% as seen in Table 4.  For more evidence of convergence Figures 3 and 4 contain 
the posterior traces and density of Brazil and France, along with the posterior traces and densities 
of the tie and home – field advantage parameters. 
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Figure 3:  Trace of Parameters for BT with Ties and HFA 
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Figure 4:  Smoothed Kernel Densities for BT Model with Ties and HFA (s = .15) 
 
 
Again, like in section 5.1, the trace of each team’s parameter definitely appears to be 
stationary (once they reach their posterior means the densities both clearly appear to follow a 
normal density centered at their respective mean (.7535 for Brazil and .6874 for France).  In 
addition, the convergence the tie and home – field advantage parameters of needs to be 
investigated.  Notice that the traces appear stationary for both parameters, and their densities 
come from their Normal posterior distributions, centered at their posterior means.  Thus, it can be 
concluded that convergence is reached for all parameters in the model, and the results from this 
section are credible. 
 
 
 
 
5.3:  Extended Bradley – Terry Model with Ties, Home – Field 
Advantage, and Neutral Site Distinction 
 
The extended Bradley – Terry model to include ties, home – field advantage, and the 
ability to distinguish between games played at a neutral site and games in which there is a home 
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team should produce better results than the previous model because of the large number of 
international games played at neutral sites.  Many of the biggest games are played at a neutral 
site (World Cup games for example), and any model for soccer data should take this into 
account.   
 
The model is still not finalized, as again it considers team parameter strength to be 
constant over time and all games of equal weight.  However, the results should improve over the 
results from section 5.2, since the model is now able to distinguish between games at a home site 
and games at a neutral site.  The results for the top twenty teams with the tie and Home – Field 
Advantage Parameter from the model (4), with 4000 burn – in iterations and a sample size of 
6000 are displayed in Table 6, and the rankings compared with those from FIFA are displayed in 
Table 7. 
 
 
Team  mean  sd  MC error Ratio 2.50% median 97.50% 
Brazil 0.8778 0.1737 0.005193 0.029896 0.5308 0.8787 1.219 
France 0.7085 0.2239 0.006581 0.029393 0.254 0.7033 1.144 
Mexico 0.7057 0.1774 0.005499 0.030998 0.3524 0.714 1.064 
Spain 0.6985 0.2395 0.007175 0.029958 0.2408 0.6977 1.185 
Italy 0.6905 0.2245 0.006762 0.03012 0.2588 0.6915 1.131 
Argentina 0.6644 0.2021 0.00646 0.031964 0.2649 0.6684 1.043 
Germany 0.6551 0.2214 0.007095 0.032046 0.233 0.6528 1.101 
Netherlands 0.6176 0.2372 0.006476 0.027302 0.1834 0.621 1.076 
Denmark 0.5657 0.2288 0.006831 0.029856 0.1179 0.5685 1.006 
Nigeria 0.5619 0.227 0.006511 0.028683 0.1289 0.5615 1.001 
England 0.5435 0.2337 0.006387 0.02733 0.08671 0.5402 1.001 
Japan 0.5427 0.2164 0.006283 0.029034 0.1276 0.5418 0.9689 
Sweden 0.5321 0.2381 0.005891 0.024742 0.058 0.5408 1.01 
USA 0.5287 0.2101 0.006333 0.030143 0.1318 0.5347 0.9246 
Iran 0.5231 0.227 0.006707 0.029546 0.07009 0.5215 0.9648 
Croatia 0.4689 0.2322 0.005553 0.023915 0.03458 0.4627 0.9364 
Czech Republic 0.4512 0.2416 0.00686 0.028394 -0.01174 0.4453 0.9095 
Costa Rica 0.4446 0.2066 0.006786 0.032846 0.04244 0.4446 0.8407 
Australia 0.4243 0.2351 0.006021 0.02561 -0.05332 0.4358 0.8642 
Ireland 0.4052 0.2405 0.007745 0.032204 -0.06381 0.4042 0.8846 
home -0.5865 0.05519 0.001272 0.023048 -0.6977 -0.5875 -0.4764 
tie -0.08614 0.03924 0.001078 0.027472 -0.1674 -0.08405 -0.01327 
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Table 6:  Results for Extended BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site  
 
 
 
Rank Team - Model Ranking Team - FIFA Ranking 
1 Brazil  Brazil 
2 France  France 
3 Mexico  Argentina 
4 Spain  Czech Republic 
5 Italy  Spain 
6 Argentina  Netherlands 
7 Germany  Mexico 
8 Netherlands  England 
9 Denmark  Portugal 
10 Nigeria  Italy 
11 England  USA 
12 Japan Ireland 
13 Sweden  Sweden 
14 USA  Denmark 
14 Iran  Turkey 
16 Croatia  Uruguay 
17 Czech Republic  Japan 
18 Costa Rica  Greece 
19 Australia  Germany 
20 Ireland  Iran 
Table 7:  BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site Rankings Compared with FIFA 
 
 
 Notice that the rankings and results barely changed from the previous section.  This 
makes sense because the only thing that was added to the model was the model’s ability to 
differentiate between games played at one team’s home site and games played at a neutral site.  
The only team that made a jump of more than a couple spots in the rankings was Iran, who 
moved from 10th in the previous model to 14th in the current model.  This makes sense because in 
the 15 neutral site games that they played, they were considered the “road” team 10 times, and 
went 7 – 3 in those games.  They were considered the “home” team 5 times, and went 3 -2 in 
those games.  Thus, because they did so well in games in which they were considered the “road” 
team, their parameter strength would be increased.  However, under the new model, they are not 
considered the “away” team in these games, and their parameter strength will reflect that. 
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 The tie parameter remains the same from the previous model, however the one 
parameter that would be expected to change, the home – field parameter does change.  It moves 
from a mean of -.4599 to a mean of -.5865 (again, larger negative magnitudes imply more home 
– field advantage).  So, by adding the neutral site distinction to the model, the home – field 
advantage becomes larger.  As Figure 5 shows, this is also expected.  In general, a team will win 
more games at home than they will at neutral sites, so if all games are considered home (even if 
they are really neutral site games), then the winning percentage for home teams will not be as 
large than it would be if only true home games were considered.  Thus, the results from this 
section follow as expected from the previous section. 
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Figure 5:  Winning Percentages for Home Teams Under Different Model Assumptions 
 
 Again, all the results from this section are based on the assumption that the parameters 
converge. As seen in Table 6, the ratio of MCMC error to posterior standard error is less than 5% 
for all the parameters.  Further evidence of their convergence can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, 
which contain the history and densities of two team parameters and the tie and home – field 
advantage parameters after the 4000 burned iterations.  As in the previous sections, the histories 
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of each parameter appear stationary and the densities all appear to come from a normal 
distribution, as they are supposed to.  Thus, the results from this section are credible. 
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Figure 6:  Trace of Parameters for BT with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site 
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Figure 7:  Smoothed Kernel Densities for BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site (s = 
.15) 
 
 
5.4:  Extended Bradley – Terry Model with Ties and Home – Field 
Advantage, Neutral Site Distinction, and Game Type 
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The results from the previous section showed improvement over the other models, but 
still lacked one key component that is vital to soccer.  The model in the previous section assumed 
that all games were of equal importance, which is clearly not true in the world of professional 
soccer.  Often times, when a team plays a friendly match it does not send its best team, instead it 
sends younger or less experienced players to enable them to gain international experience.  By 
introducing a parameter into the model to distinguish between friendly matches and competitive 
matches, the model should produce better results.  Recall from section 1.3 that the model uses a 
team’s full parameter for competitive games, and some multiple of the parameter determined by 
the data for friendly games.  This will allow the model to give the appropriate weight to friendly 
matches and produce a more credible weighting system.  
As stated in the previous sections, the model is still not complete because it still assumes 
team parameter strength remains constant over time, however the results should still show 
improvement over previous models.  The results for the top twenty teams with the tie, Home – 
Field Advantage Parameter, and Friendly match parameter from the model (5), with 4000 burn – 
in iterations and a sample size of 6000 are displayed in Table 8, and the rankings compared with 
those from FIFA are displayed in Table 9. 
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Team  mean  sd  MC error Ratio 2.50% median 97.50% 
Brazil 1.089 0.1999 0.006202 0.031026 0.6789 1.09 1.483 
France 0.8148 0.2441 0.007059 0.028918 0.3465 0.8089 1.296 
Mexico 0.8144 0.194 0.006292 0.032433 0.4426 0.8118 1.198 
Argentina 0.7352 0.2178 0.005623 0.025817 0.3227 0.7414 1.171 
Italy 0.6861 0.24 0.006852 0.02855 0.2124 0.6909 1.164 
Spain 0.649 0.2426 0.00734 0.030256 0.164 0.651 1.126 
Netherlands 0.6322 0.2536 0.00673 0.026538 0.1239 0.6309 1.137 
Germany 0.6086 0.2328 0.005635 0.024205 0.1596 0.6053 1.065 
Japan 0.6061 0.2346 0.007058 0.030085 0.1285 0.6108 1.062 
Australia 0.6012 0.2497 0.00708 0.028354 0.1099 0.6062 1.113 
England 0.5496 0.2498 0.006883 0.027554 0.07462 0.554 1.029 
Nigeria 0.5333 0.2225 0.006333 0.028463 0.09634 0.5345 0.9587 
USA 0.5282 0.2004 0.006123 0.030554 0.1322 0.5228 0.9041 
Iran 0.511 0.233 0.005962 0.025588 0.06543 0.5117 0.9735 
Denmark 0.5109 0.2421 0.007154 0.02955 0.03662 0.5134 0.9882 
Sweden 0.5058 0.245 0.007748 0.031624 0.01239 0.4966 0.9954 
Croatia 0.474 0.2455 0.007788 0.031723 -0.00196 0.4697 0.942 
Costa Rica 0.4654 0.2137 0.005693 0.02664 0.05305 0.4684 0.8862 
Czech Republic 0.4652 0.2482 0.008242 0.033207 -0.02944 0.4576 0.9682 
Portugal 0.4651 0.2531 0.006133 0.024232 -0.04178 0.4652 0.9451 
friendly 0.2143 0.1534 0.003928 0.025606 0.01069 0.187 0.5737 
home -0.6073 0.05392 0.001444 0.02678 -0.7149 -0.6058 -0.5024 
tie -0.08822 0.03899 0.001096 0.02811 -0.1636 -0.08768 -0.0137 
Table 8: Results for Extended BT Model with Ties, HFA, Neutral Site, and Game Type 
 
Rank Team - FIFA Ranking 
Team - Model 
Ranking 
1 Brazil Brazil 
2 France France 
3 Argentina Mexico 
4 Czech Republic Argentina 
5 Spain Italy 
6 Netherlands Spain 
7 Mexico Netherlands 
8 England Germany 
9 Portugal Japan 
10 Italy Australia 
11 USA England 
12 Ireland Nigeria 
13 Sweden USA 
14 Denmark Iran 
14 Turkey Denmark 
16 Uruguay Sweden 
17 Japan Croatia 
18 Greece Costa Rica 
19 Germany Czech Republic 
20 Iran Portugal 
Table 9: BT Model with Ties, HFA, Neutral Site, and Game Type Rankings Compared 
with FIFA 
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 Both the rankings and results have barely changed from the previous section’s results, as 
the top nineteen teams are the same for both sections and Portugal, ranked 21st in the previous 
section’s model replaced Ireland, ranked 24th in this model, as the 20th ranked team.  The home – 
field advantage parameter and the tie parameter estimates also remain very similar to their 
estimates in the previous section.  It is interesting that the results remain very similar because the 
model does make a large distinction between competitive matches and friendly matches.  The 
parameter for friendly matches has a mean of .2143, and its 95% credible interval of (0.003928, 
0.5737) is still showing that friendly matches are given far less weight than competitive ones.  
Consider the mean of the parameter estimate.  It implies that friendly matches are worth only 
about one – fifth of what competitive matches are worth for estimating team parameter strength.  
This is a large difference that would be expected to change the results more significantly.  This 
leads to the question of whether the model is actually worth using if it is more complicated but 
does not improve the results.   
 
One possible way to determine this would be to look at the squared error.  The only 
problem is how to define a squared error for these type of results.  One measure of squared error 
that could be useful would be 
N
gFifaRankinngModelRanki
MSE i
ii∑
=
−
=
158
1
2)(
, where N is the 
number of teams included in the model.  This measure will show which model gives results that 
match up closet to FIFA’s results.  While the goal of the project was not to get ranking that were 
similar to those of FIFA (in fact it was the opposite; to obtain a better ranking system than 
FIFA’s), FIFA’s rankings are considered very credible by most people.  Thus, although an 
improved ranking system is trying to be created, one that differed greatly from FIFA’s rankings 
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may be considered good statistically but would not be considered credible in the real world.  
Thus, the MSE defined above is an accurate measure of how well the model is performing.  
Table 10 gives the MSE for each of the models considered so far. 
 
Model (Section Found In) MSE 
General BT Model (5.1) 2,227 
BT Model with Ties and HFA (5.2) 783 
BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Distinction (5.3) 760 
BT Model with Ties, HFA, Neutral Distinction, and Game Type (5.4) 810 
Table 10:  MSE for Each Model Considered 
 
The three models considered with ties all perform similarly with the model from section 5.3 
performing slightly better than the other two.  However, because of the extra information that the 
model considered in this section reveals about game type, it is worth using.  Also, since the goal 
of the project was not to find a model that would compare favorably with FIFA’s rankings, then 
one model would have to outperform another one significantly with regards to the MSE to be 
considered a superior model.  For example, all three models that consider ties greatly outperform 
the general Bradley – Terry model and can be considered superior.  As stated before, these are 
not the final models, they are only building blocks in the construction of the final model.  
 
 The results from this section are based on the assumption that the parameters converge.  
Evidence of their convergence can be seen in Figures 8 and 9, which contain the history and 
densities of two team parameters and the tie, home – field advantage, and friendly parameters 
after the 4000 burned iterations.  As in the previous sections, the histories of each parameter 
appear stationary (for the friendly parameter, remember that it comes from a beta distribution so 
it must be greater than zero).  The densities all appear to come from a normal distribution for the 
team parameters and the tie and home – field advantage parameters as they should.  The Friendly 
parameter appears to come from a beta distribution, also as it should. Thus, the there is enough 
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evidence that the parameters converge and the results presented in this section can be viewed 
as credible. 
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Figure 8:  Trace of Parameters for BT with Ties, HFA, Neutral Site, and Game Type 
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Figure 9: Smoothed Kernel Densities for BT with Ties, HFA, Neutral Site, and Game Type 
(s = .15) 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5:  Dynamic Bradley – Terry Model  
 
 Up until this point, each section has incorporated more information about the games and 
the teams involved then the previous section.  However, the final step in the model does not add 
any new information about the games themselves.  The last step drops the assumption that each 
team’s parameter strength is constant.  The final model, found in Chapter 3 drops this 
assumption and assumes that each team’s strength parameter changes over time.  The model in 
Chapter 3 does not specify the number of time periods.  The limitations of Winbugs played a 
major role in determining the number of time periods to use.  When the dimensions k (wins, loss, 
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or tie), h (home or neutral), t (time period 1, 2, …T), and g (competitive game or friendly) in 
ijkhtgy  exceeded 36 Winbugs would crash while attempting to compile.  Thus, there were 
limitations on the number of time periods to be used.  Since k, h, and g all were fixed (k = 3, h = 
2, and g = 2), then the only dimension that could vary was t.  Considering t should be as large as 
possible, and 
3612223 ≤⋅=⋅⋅⋅=⋅⋅⋅ ttgthk , 
 
thus 3≤t , so T  = 3 was chosen.  Therefore t = 1 corresponds to all games played up to and 
including 2002, t =2 includes all games played in 2003, and t = 3 includes all games played in 
2004.    When the model was ran using the gamma prior (regardless of the choices for a0 and b0, 
Winbugs ran crashes while the burn – in iterations were taking place.  Thus, instead of placing a 
prior on ω, a noninformative Uniform distribution was placed on σ.  Using a U(0,100) prior 
distribution, σ did not converge.  Figure 10 shows the history of a sample of size 6000 after 4000 
burn – in iterations.   
 
sigma
iteration
4001 6000 8000
    1.0
   1.25
    1.5
   1.75
    2.0
   2.25
 
Figure 10:  Convergence of Sigma with a U(0,100) Prior Distribution 
  
 It is clear that convergence is not being reached in Figure 10, as the plot is clearly not 
stationary.  Next, an attempt was made to make the prior distribution slightly informative, and a 
U(0,10) prior distribution was placed on σ.  However, σ did not converge again after 4000 burn – 
in iterations.  In order to be certain that σ would not converge if more samples were burned, 
85,000 samples were burned.  Figure 11 shows the history of σ after both 4,000 and 85,000 burn 
– in iterations.  In each case, it is easy to see that σ is not converging.  In addition, the ratio of 
MCMC error to posterior standard error exceeded 5% for many of the parameters, thus 
indicating failure of convergence. 
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sigma: 4000 Burn - Ins
iteration
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Figure 11:  Convergence of Sigma with a U(0,10) Prior Distribution for 4,000 and 85,000 
Burn – Ins 
 
 
Since the parameters for this model did not converge, an attempt was made to run the 
model with σ2 being held constant.  However, convergence failed for all values assigned to σ2.  
Due to the manner in which the data was set up, there were a lot more games in the first time 
period (all games up to and in 2002) than in either of the last two time periods.  This may have 
been the cause of failed convergence.  By removing the friendly match parameter from the 
model, the number of time periods could be doubled.  Thus, the game type parameter was 
removed from the model which allowed 6 time periods to be considered (1999 and before, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004).   
A small variance, σ2 = .1 was assigned to the noise in the AR(1) model described in 
section 1.4.  The results of 6000 samples after 4000 burn – in iterations can be seen in Tables 11 
and 12.   
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Team  mean  sd  MC error Ratio 2.50% median 97.50% 
Mexico 2.472 0.5546 0.01333 0.024035 1.412 2.467 3.561 
Argentina 2.312 0.5566 0.01374 0.024686 1.206 2.309 3.405 
Brazil 2.276 0.498 0.01209 0.024277 1.304 2.276 3.251 
England 2.132 0.5846 0.01356 0.023195 1.006 2.112 3.32 
France 2.08 0.5577 0.01153 0.020674 0.9793 2.074 3.159 
Spain 2.072 0.5839 0.01223 0.020945 0.9292 2.06 3.229 
Japan 2.068 0.5247 0.01128 0.021498 1.032 2.069 3.103 
Iran 1.99 0.5755 0.01275 0.022155 0.8678 1.991 3.135 
Czech Republic 1.983 0.5718 0.0134 0.023435 0.862 1.982 3.117 
Italy 1.872 0.5787 0.01489 0.02573 0.7452 1.873 3.048 
Nigeria 1.838 0.5627 0.01106 0.019655 0.7805 1.823 2.955 
USA 1.814 0.5215 0.01182 0.022665 0.8271 1.807 2.869 
Sweden 1.734 0.5628 0.01301 0.023117 0.6592 1.736 2.85 
Ireland 1.716 0.5872 0.01469 0.025017 0.5282 1.724 2.866 
Netherlands 1.713 0.609 0.01246 0.02046 0.5349 1.708 2.935 
Greece 1.681 0.5619 0.01251 0.022264 0.5978 1.683 2.778 
Germany 1.675 0.5981 0.01338 0.022371 0.5006 1.686 2.851 
Denmark 1.585 0.5487 0.01146 0.020886 0.5503 1.575 2.68 
Croatia 1.531 0.5785 0.01244 0.021504 0.4188 1.525 2.695 
Turkey 1.413 0.5513 0.01159 0.021023 0.3223 1.405 2.501 
home -0.676 0.06253 0.001638 0.026195 -0.7986 -0.6781 -0.555 
tie 0.04315 0.04105 0.001253 0.030524 -0.03286 0.04081 0.1263 
Table 11: Results for Dynamic BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site  
 
 
Rank Team - FIFA Ranking Team - Model Ranking 
1  Brazil Mexico 
2  France Argentina 
3  Argentina Brazil 
4  Czech Republic England 
5  Spain France 
6  Netherlands Spain 
7  Mexico Japan 
8  England Iran 
9  Portugal Czech Republic 
10  Italy Italy 
11  USA Nigeria 
12 Ireland USA 
13  Sweden Sweden 
14  Denmark Ireland 
14  Turkey Netherlands 
16  Uruguay Greece 
17  Japan Germany 
18  Greece Denmark 
19  Germany Croatia 
20  Iran Turkey 
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Table 12:  Dynamic BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site Rankings Compared 
with FIFA 
 
 
 The results from this model appear to be much more consistent with what would be 
expected than the results from previous sections.  The two teams that appear in the top twenty for 
the model that do not appear in FIFA’s top twenty, Nigeria and Croatia, rank 21st and 23rd 
respectively in FIFA’s rankings.  Australia, the team that had inexplicably been in the model’s 
top twenty for the previous models is now ranked 31st.  In addition, the MSE, as defined in the 
previous section, is 541, a large improvement over all of the previous models.  Thus, the model 
performs well despite missing the game type parameter.  It is also interesting to note that this 
model is the first in which Brazil did not rank first, as Mexico held that honor. 
 The ratio of MCMC error to standard error is much less than 5% as seen in Table 11, and 
Figures 12 and 13 show the history and density of Brazil and France in the last time period, the 
home – field advantage parameter, and the tie parameter.  In this instance, the histories are 
displayed starting with the first iteration, to show the parameters path of convergence.    
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Figure 12: Trace of Parameters for Dynamic BT with Ties, HFA, and Neutral Site  
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Figure 13: Smoothed Kernel Densities for Dynamic BT Model with Ties, HFA, and Neutral 
Site (s = .15) 
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Convergence is clearly met in the case of Brazil and France, however is difficult to see 
in the home – field and tie parameters.  Figure 14 shows home – field and tie parameters zoomed 
in to show that they are clearly converging. 
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Figure 14:  Zoom of Trace for Home - Field and Tie Parameters from Figure 12 
 
 
 Since the model is now dynamic, the team strengths change over time.  This can be seen 
in Figure 12, which displays the team’s mean strength parameter as it changes over time.  Figure 
12 displays the team strength of Brazil and France (who have been discussed throughout the 
paper), Mexico(ranked first), Australia (also discussed throughout the paper), and Luxembourg 
(ranked last by every model considered).  It is interesting to see how the time dynamic works.  
Brazil appears to be very good throughout time, without much improvement however.  Mexico 
on the other hand, starts off good, but gets dramatically better, particularly between the years 
2001 and 2004 eventually surpassing Brazil in 2003.  France’s dynamic is also interesting, as 
they start out strong, then get worse in 2000, before vast improvement between 2000 and 2002, 
where they level off. 
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Team Strength vs. Time
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Figure 15:  Team Strength vs. Time 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 Although the final model was not able to be achieved due to convergence failure and 
limitations of Winbugs, the paper produces two models that give substantial information about 
the world of soccer.  Each of the models from the final two sections produces valuable 
information.  The full results for both models can be found in Appendix C, and the parameter 
histories and densities can be found in Appendix D.  Since the home field advantage and tie 
parameters do not differ greatly in each model, the same inference can be made on them from 
both models.  Home field plays a major role in the outcome of games.  According to both 
models, for two teams very close in strength, home – field can swing the probability of one team 
beating another by about 15%.   Also, in both models, the tie parameter is negative and small in 
magnitude, implying that a tie is about slightly less likely to occur than a win or a loss for all 
things considered equal (similar team strength, neutral site).  In addition to the inferences 
provided by both models, each model provides valuable information on its own.   
The model from section 5.4, which includes game type as a parameter but is not dynamic, 
provides information on how much a friendly match contributes to a team’s strength compared 
with a competitive match.  According to the model, a friendly is worth about 21% of what a 
competitive match is worth when estimating team strength.  This is a significant difference from 
the 50% weight that it carries in FIFA’s ranking system when compared with World Cup 
matches.  For other matches, it is worth more than 50%.   
The model from section 5.5, which is dynamic but does not include game type as a 
parameter shows how team strength can change over time.   The method allows the parameter 
strength to change over time in a non – arbitrary manner, different from FIFA’s method of 
weighting games from different years arbitrarily.  Because of the time variability in team 
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strength Mexico and France both surpass Brazil by 2004, Brazil is still currently ranked first in 
the world by FIFA.   
Due to limitations, a final model that incorporated both the game type parameter and the 
dynamic nature of the team strength parameters could not be created.  If more dimensions could 
be added, then a model that includes more game types (include all 6 game types as parameters, 
not just friendly and competitive matches) and more time periods (which could lead to 
convergence) could be tried.  If this could be achieved, then rankings superior to FIFA’s, both 
statistically and in the real – world, could be created.  If a statistical model would not be accepted 
in the real world, the work done in this paper can still contribute to the FIFA rankings.  Clearly, 
according to the results produced by all the models, FIFA’s small bonus of 3 points awarded to 
the away team is not enough, as home – field advantage plays a much more prominent role in the 
outcome of games.  In addition, the weight assigned to friendly matches appears to be too high 
based on the results from the model in section 5.4.  Thus, extensions of this work could produce 
rankings superior to FIFA’s. If this type of ranking procedure is not accepted by the real world, 
this work could still have an impact.  FIFA could use this statistical model, or a similar one to 
determine the arbitrary weights that they assign throughout their ranking system.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A - FIFA Rankings as of December, 2004 
 
 
Rank Team Points 
1  Brazil 843 
2  France 792 
3  Argentina 785 
4  Czech Republic 777 
5  Spain 765 
6  Netherlands 758 
7  Mexico 753 
8  England 752 
9  Portugal 747 
10  Italy 738 
11  USA 726 
12 Ireland 716 
13  Sweden 715 
14  Denmark 711 
14  Turkey 711 
16  Uruguay 708 
17  Japan 707 
18  Greece 706 
19  Germany 705 
20  Iran 697 
21  Nigeria 690 
22  Korea Rep. 688 
23  Cameroon 677 
23  Croatia 677 
25  Poland 672 
26  Colombia 669 
27  Costa Rica 668 
28  Saudi Arabia 665 
29  Romania 664 
30  Paraguay 661 
31  Senegal 657 
32  Russia 652 
33  Morocco 646 
34  Egypt 644 
35  Norway 633 
35  Tunisia 633 
37  Bulgaria 623 
38  South Africa 619 
39  Ecuador 616 
40  Côte d'Ivoire 613 
41  Jordan 611 
42  Slovenia 608 
43  Finland 607 
44  Iraq 603 
45  Belgium 600 
46  Serbia and Montenegro 599 
47  Uzbekistan 598 
48  Israel 595 
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49  Bahrain 594 
49  Jamaica 594 
51  Mali 589 
51  Switzerland 589 
53  Slovakia 587 
54  China PR 585 
54  Kuwait 585 
56  Oman 582 
57  Australia 577 
58  Honduras 575 
59  Zimbabwe 572 
60  Libya 566 
61  Venezuela 565 
62  Trinidad and Tobago 564 
63  Hungary 562 
64  Latvia 560 
65  Peru 558 
65  Qatar 558 
67  Wales 555 
68  Belarus 554 
69  Zambia 552 
70  Guatemala 551 
71  Angola 545 
72  Algeria 536 
73  Chile 533 
73  Kenya 533 
75  Cuba 532 
76  Ghana 528 
77  Congo DR 527 
78  Bosnia-Herzegovina 526 
78  Thailand 526 
80  Estonia 525 
81  United Arab Emirates 523 
82  Austria 522 
83  Burkina Faso 520 
84  Syria 516 
85  Albania 515 
85  Guinea 515 
85  Scotland 515 
88  Togo 513 
89  Canada 509 
90  Indonesia 504 
91  Iceland 495 
92  Bolivia 485 
93  Haiti 481 
93  Korea DPR 481 
93  New Zealand 481 
96  Turkmenistan 478 
97  Rwanda 475 
98  Lithuania 472 
98  Panama 472 
100  Botswana 462 
101  Vietnam 457 
102  Georgia 455 
103  Lebanon 448 
104  El Salvador 446 
105  Northern Ireland 443 
106  Cyprus 442 
107  Gabon 438 
107  Malawi 438 
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109  Singapore 435 
110  Azerbaijan 432 
111  Moldova 429 
111  St. Lucia 429 
111  Sudan 429 
114  Congo 420 
115  St. Kitts and Nevis 418 
116  Armenia 402 
117  Malaysia 401 
118  Barbados 393 
119  Liberia 384 
120  Tahiti 381 
120  Yemen 381 
122  Mozambique 379 
122  Palestine 379 
122  Swaziland 379 
125  Cape Verde Islands 377 
126  Solomon Islands 375 
127  India 365 
128  Malta 355 
129  Fiji 354 
130  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 337 
131  Andorra 336 
132  Maldives 335 
133  Liechtenstein 330 
134  Vanuatu 325 
135  Grenada 322 
135  Lesotho 322 
135  Myanmar 322 
138  Kazakhstan 313 
138  Madagascar 313 
140  Surinam 299 
141  Kyrgyzstan 293 
142  Gambia 260 
143  Luxembourg 259 
144  Namibia 239 
144  Nicaragua 239 
146  Sierra Leone 232 
147  Papua New Guinea 231 
148  Netherlands Antilles 222 
149  San Marino 221 
150  British Virgin Islands 218 
150  Dominica 218 
152  Dominican Republic 195 
153  Samoa 167 
154  New Caledonia 119 
155  Cook Islands 91 
156  Bahamas 90 
157  US Virgin Islands 70 
158  Guam 15 
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Appendix B – WinBugs Code for Each Model 
 
 B.1 – General Bradley Terry Model 
 
 
model{ 
for (i in 1:1357) 
     { 
Y[i]<-1; 
N[i]<-1; 
Y[i] ~ dbin(p[i], N[i]); 
A[i]<-
X[i,1]*Alb+X[i,2]*Alg+X[i,3]*And+X[i,4]*Ang+X[i,5]*Arg+X[i,6]*Arm+X[i,7]*Austral+X[i,
8]*Austria+X[i,9]*Azer+X[i,10]*Bahamas; 
B[i]<-
X[i,11]*Bahrain+X[i,12]*Barb+X[i,13]*Belar+X[i,14]*Belg+X[i,15]*Bol+X[i,16]*BosHer+X[i
,17]*Bot+X[i,18]*Bra+X[i,19]*BriVirIsl; 
C[i]<-
X[i,20]*Bul+X[i,21]*BurFas+X[i,22]*Cam+X[i,23]*Can+X[i,24]*CapVerIsl+X[i,25]*Chil+X[i
,26]*ChiPR+X[i,27]*Col+X[i,28]*Con; 
D[i]<-
X[i,29]*ConDR+X[i,30]*CookIsl+X[i,31]*CosRic+X[i,32]*CoteIvo+X[i,33]*Cro+X[i,34]*Cub
a+X[i,35]*Cyp+X[i,36]*CzechRep; 
E[i]<-
X[i,37]*Den+X[i,38]*Dom+X[i,39]*DomRep+X[i,40]*Ecuad+X[i,41]*Egypt+X[i,42]*ElSal+X
[i,43]*Eng+X[i,44]*Est+X[i,45]*Fiji; 
F[i]<-
X[i,46]*Fin+X[i,47]*Fra+X[i,48]*Gab+X[i,49]*Gam+X[i,50]*Geo+X[i,51]*Ger+X[i,52]*Gha+
X[i,53]*Gre+X[i,54]*Gren; 
G[i]<-
X[i,55]*Guam+X[i,56]*Gua+X[i,57]*Guin+X[i,58]*Hai+X[i,59]*Hon+X[i,60]*Hun+X[i,61]*I
ce+X[i,62]*India+X[i,63]*Indon; 
H[i]<-
X[i,64]*Iran+X[i,65]*Iraq+X[i,66]*Ire+X[i,67]*Isr+X[i,68]*Ita+X[i,69]*Jam+X[i,70]*Jap+X[i,
71]*Jor+X[i,72]*Kaz+X[i,73]*Ken; 
I[i]<-
X[i,74]*KorDPR+X[i,75]*KorRep+X[i,76]*Kuw+X[i,77]*Kyr+X[i,78]*Lat+X[i,79]*Leb+X[i,
80]*Les+X[i,81]*Liber+X[i,82]*Libya; 
J[i]<-
X[i,83]*Lie+X[i,84]*Lit+X[i,85]*Lux+X[i,86]*Mad+X[i,87]*Malaw+X[i,88]*Malay+X[i,89]*
Maldi+X[i,90]*Mali+X[i,91]*Malt+X[i,92]*Mar; 
K[i]<-
X[i,93]*Mex+X[i,94]*Mol+X[i,95]*Mor+X[i,96]*Moz+X[i,97]*Mya+X[i,98]*Nam+X[i,99]*N
etAnt+X[i,100]*Net+X[i,101]*NewCal; 
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L[i]<-
X[i,102]*NewZea+X[i,103]*Nic+X[i,104]*Nig+X[i,105]*NorIre+X[i,106]*Nor+X[i,107]*Oma
n+X[i,108]*Pal+X[i,109]*Pan; 
M[i]<-
X[i,110]*PapNewGui+X[i,111]*Par+X[i,112]*Peru+X[i,113]*Pol+X[i,114]*Por+X[i,115]*Qat
+X[i,116]*Rom+X[i,117]*Rus+X[i,118]*Rwa; 
N2[i]<-
X[i,119]*SauAra+X[i,120]*Sam+X[i,121]*SanMar+X[i,122]*Sco+X[i,123]*Sen+X[i,124]*Ser
Mon+X[i,125]*SieLeo+X[i,126]*Sin; 
O[i]<-
X[i,127]*Slovak+X[i,128]*Sloven+X[i,129]*SolIsl+X[i,130]*SouAfr+X[i,131]*Spa+X[i,132]*
StKitNev+X[i,133]*StLuc; 
P[i]<-
X[i,134]*StVinGre+X[i,135]*Sud+X[i,136]*Sur+X[i,137]*Swaz+X[i,138]*Swe+X[i,139]*Swit
+X[i,140]*Syr+X[i,141]*Tah; 
Q[i]<-
X[i,142]*Thail+X[i,143]*Togo+X[i,144]*TriTob+X[i,145]*Tun+X[i,146]*Tur+X[i,147]*Turk
men+X[i,148]*UniAraEmi+X[i,149]*Uru; 
R[i]<-
X[i,150]*USVirIsl+X[i,151]*USA+X[i,152]*Uzb+X[i,153]*Van+X[i,154]*Ven+X[i,155]*Vie+
X[i,156]*Wal+X[i,157]*Yem+X[i,158]*Yug; 
S[i]<-X[i,159]*Zai+X[i,160]*Zam+X[i,161]*Zim; 
logit(p[i])<-
A[i]+B[i]+C[i]+D[i]+E[i]+F[i]+G[i]+H[i]+I[i]+J[i]+K[i]+L[i]+M[i]+N2[i]+O[i]+P[i]+Q[i]+R[i]
+S[i]; 
} 
} 
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B.2 – Extended Bradley Terry Model with Ties and Home Field 
Advantage 
 
 
model{ 
 
for (i in 1:161) 
{ 
for (j in 1:161) 
{ 
       p[i,j,1] <- (exp(alpha[i]))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] + home) + exp(tie + (alpha[i] + 
alpha[j] + home)/2)); 
       p[i,j,2] <- (exp(alpha[j] + home))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] + home) + exp(tie + (alpha[i] 
+ alpha[j] + home)/2)); 
       p[i,j,3] <- (exp(tie + (alpha[i] + alpha[j] + home)/2))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] + home) + 
exp(tie + (alpha[i] + alpha[j] + home)/2)); 
} 
} 
 
for (n in 1:161) 
{ 
for (q in 1:161) 
{ 
  Y[n,q,1] <- WNO1[n,q] + WNF1[n,q] + WNO2[n,q] + WNF2[n,q] + WNO3[n,q] 
+ WNF3[n,q] + WNO4[n,q] + WNF4[n,q] + WNO5[n,q]+ WNF5[n,q] + WNO6[n,q] + 
WNF6[n,q] + WHO1[n,q] + WHF1[n,q] + WHO2[n,q] + WHF2[n,q] + WHO3[n,q] + 
WHF3[n,q] + WHO4[n,q] + WHF4[n,q] + WHO5[n,q] + WHF5[n,q] + WHO6[n,q] + 
WHF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2] <- LNO1[n,q] + LNF1[n,q] + LNO2[n,q] + LNF2[n,q] + LNO3[n,q] + 
LNF3[n,q] + LNO4[n,q] + LNF4[n,q] + LNO5[n,q]+ LNF5[n,q] + LNO6[n,q] + LNF6[n,q] + 
LHO1[n,q] + LHF1[n,q] + LHO2[n,q] + LHF2[n,q] + LHO3[n,q] + LHF3[n,q] + LHO4[n,q] + 
LHF4[n,q] + LHO5[n,q] + LHF5[n,q] + LHO6[n,q] + LHF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3] <- TNO1[n,q] + TNF1[n,q] + TNO2[n,q] + TNF2[n,q] + TNO3[n,q] + 
TNF3[n,q] + TNO4[n,q] + TNF4[n,q] + TNO5[n,q]+ TNF5[n,q] + TNO6[n,q] + TNF6[n,q] + 
THO1[n,q] + THF1[n,q] + THO2[n,q] + THF2[n,q] + THO3[n,q] + THF3[n,q] + THO4[n,q] + 
THF4[n,q] + THO5[n,q] + THF5[n,q] + THO6[n,q] + THF6[n,q]; 
   
} 
} 
 
for (v in 1:161) 
{ 
for(w in 1:161) 
{ 
N[v,w] <- Y[v,w,1] + Y[v,w,2] + Y[v,w,3]; 
} 
 56 
} 
 
for (d in 1:161) 
{ 
for (f in 1:161) 
{ 
for (g in 1:3) 
{ 
mu[d,f,g] <- N[d,f]*p[d,f,g]; 
Y[d,f,g] ~ dpois(mu[d,f,g]); 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (o in 1:160) 
{ 
 alpha[o] ~ dnorm(0.0, 10); 
} 
 
alpha[161] <- 0; 
home ~ dnorm(0, .0001); 
tie ~ dnorm(0,.0001); 
 
} 
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B.3 – Extended Bradley Terry Model with Ties and Neutral Site 
Distinction 
 
model{ 
 
for (i in 1:161) 
{ 
for (j in 1:161) 
{ 
for(m in 1:2) 
{ 
       p[i,j,1,m] <- (exp(alpha[i]))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] + (m-1)*home) + exp(tie + 
(alpha[i] + alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
       p[i,j,2,m] <- (exp(alpha[j] + (m-1)*home))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] + (m-1)*home) + 
exp(tie + (alpha[i] + alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
       p[i,j,3,m] <- (exp(tie + (alpha[i] + alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2))/(exp(alpha[i]) + exp(alpha[j] 
+ (m-1)*home) + exp(tie + (alpha[i] + alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (n in 1:161) 
{ 
for (q in 1:161) 
{ 
  Y[n,q,1,1] <- 
WNO1[n,q]+WNF1[n,q]+WNO2[n,q]+WNF2[n,q]+WNO3[n,q]+WNF3[n,q]+WNO4[n,q]+WN
F4[n,q]+WNO5[n,q]+WNF5[n,q]+WNO6[n,q]+WNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2] <- 
WHO1[n,q]+WHF1[n,q]+WHO2[n,q]+WHF2[n,q]+WHO3[n,q]+WHF3[n,q]+WHO4[n,q]+WH
F4[n,q]+WHO5[n,q]+WHF5[n,q]+WHO6[n,q]+WHF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,1] <- 
LNO1[n,q]+LNF1[n,q]+LNO2[n,q]+LNF2[n,q]+LNO3[n,q]+LNF3[n,q]+LNO4[n,q]+LNF4[n,q
]+LNO5[n,q]+LNF5[n,q]+LNO6[n,q]+LNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2] <- 
LHO1[n,q]+LHF1[n,q]+LHO2[n,q]+LHF2[n,q]+LHO3[n,q]+LHF3[n,q]+LHO4[n,q]+LHF4[n,q
]+LHO5[n,q]+LHF5[n,q]+LHO6[n,q]+LHF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1] <- 
TNO1[n,q]+TNF1[n,q]+TNO2[n,q]+TNF2[n,q]+TNO3[n,q]+TNF3[n,q]+TNO4[n,q]+TNF4[n,q
]+TNO5[n,q]+TNF5[n,q]+TNO6[n,q]+TNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,2] <- 
THO1[n,q]+THF1[n,q]+THO2[n,q]+THF2[n,q]+THO3[n,q]+THF3[n,q]+THO4[n,q]+THF4[n,q
]+THO5[n,q]+THF5[n,q]+THO6[n,q]+THF6[n,q]; 
} 
} 
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for (v in 1:161) 
{ 
for(w in 1:161) 
{ 
N[v,w] <- Y[v,w,1,1] + Y[v,w,1,2] + Y[v,w,2,1] + Y[v,w,2,2] + Y[v,w,3,1] + Y[v,w,3,2]; 
} 
} 
 
for (d in 1:161) 
{ 
for (f in 1:161) 
{ 
for (g in 1:3) 
{ 
for(h in 1:2) 
{ 
 
mu[d,f,g,h] <- N[d,f]*p[d,f,g,h]; 
Y[d,f,g,h] ~ dpois(mu[d,f,g,h]); 
} 
}  
} 
} 
 
 
for (o in 1:160) 
{ 
 alpha[o] ~ dnorm(0.0, 10); 
} 
 
alpha[161] <- 0; 
home ~ dnorm(0, .0001); 
tie ~ dnorm(0,.0001); 
 
} 
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B.4 – Extended Bradley Terry Model with Ties, Neutral Site 
Distinction, and Game Type 
 
 
model{ 
 
for (i in 1:161) 
{ 
for (j in 1:161) 
{ 
for(m in 1:2) 
{  
for(l in 1:2)  
{ 
       prob[i,j,1,m,l] <- (exp(gtype[l]*alpha[i]))/(exp(gtype[l]*alpha[i]) + exp(gtype[l]*alpha[j] + 
(m-1)*home) + exp(tie + (gtype[l]*alpha[i] + gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
       prob[i,j,2,m,l] <- (exp(gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-1)*home))/(exp(gtype[l]*alpha[i]) + 
exp(gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-1)*home) + exp(tie + (gtype[l]*alpha[i] + gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-
1)*home)/2)); 
       prob[i,j,3,m,l] <- (exp(tie + (gtype[l]*alpha[i] + gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-
1)*home)/2))/(exp(gtype[l]*alpha[i]) + exp(gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-1)*home) + exp(tie + 
(gtype[l]*alpha[i] + gtype[l]*alpha[j] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (n in 1:161) 
{ 
 for (q in 1:161) 
 { 
Y[n,q,1,1,1] <- WNO1[n,q] + WNO2[n,q] + WNO3[n,q] + WNO4[n,q] + WNO5[n,q] +  
 WNO6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,1,2,1] <- WHO1[n,q] + WHO2[n,q] + WHO3[n,q] + WHO4[n,q] + WHO5[n,q] +  
 WHO6[n,q];   
Y[n,q,2,1,1] <- LNO1[n,q] + LNO2[n,q] + LNO3[n,q] + LNO4[n,q] + LNO5[n,q] +  
 LNO6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,2,2,1] <- LHO1[n,q] + LHO2[n,q] + LHO3[n,q] + LHO4[n,q] + LHO5[n,q] +  
 LHO6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,3,1,1] <- TNO1[n,q] + TNO2[n,q] + TNO3[n,q] + TNO4[n,q] + TNO5[n,q] +  
 TNO6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,3,2,1] <- THO1[n,q] + THO2[n,q] + THO3[n,q] + THO4[n,q] + THO5[n,q] +  
 THO6[n,q]; 
   
 
Y[n,q,1,1,2] <- WNF1[n,q] + WNF2[n,q] + WNF3[n,q] + WNF4[n,q] + WNF5[n,q] +  
 WNF6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,1,2,2] <- WHF1[n,q] + WHF2[n,q] + WHF3[n,q] + WHF4[n,q] + WHF5[n,q] +  
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 WHF6[n,q];   
Y[n,q,2,1,2] <- LNF1[n,q] + LNF2[n,q] + LNF3[n,q] + LNF4[n,q] + LNF5[n,q] +  
 LNF6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,2,2,2] <- LHF1[n,q] + LHF2[n,q] + LHF3[n,q] + LHF4[n,q] + LHF5[n,q] +  
 LHF6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,3,1,2] <- TNF1[n,q] + TNF2[n,q] + TNF3[n,q] + TNF4[n,q] + TNF5[n,q] +  
 TNF6[n,q]; 
Y[n,q,3,2,2] <- THF1[n,q] + THF2[n,q] + THF3[n,q] + THF4[n,q] + THF5[n,q] +         
 THF6[n,q]; 
   
} 
} 
 
for (v in 1:161) 
{ 
for(w in 1:161) 
{ 
for (h in 1:2) 
{ 
for (m in 1:2) 
{ 
N[v,w,h,m] <- Y[v,w,1,h,m] + Y[v,w,2,h,m] + Y[v,w,3,h,m]; 
} 
} 
} 
} 
for (d in 1:161) 
{ 
for (f in 1:161) 
{ 
for (g in 1:3) 
{ 
for(h in 1:2) 
{ 
for (m in 1:2) 
{ 
 
mu[d,f,g,h,m] <- N[d,f,h,m]*prob[d,f,g,h,m]; 
Y[d,f,g,h,m] ~ dpois(mu[d,f,g,h,m]);     
} 
}  
 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (o in 1:160) 
{ 
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alpha[o] ~ dnorm(0.0, 10); 
} 
 
alpha[161] <- 0; 
 
gtype[1] <- 1; 
gtype[2] ~ dbeta(1,1); 
home ~ dnorm(0, .0001); 
tie ~ dnorm(0,.0001); 
} 
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B.5 – Dynamic Bradley Terry Model with Ties and Neutral Site 
Distinction 
 
model{ 
 
for (j in 1:161) 
{ 
alpha[j,1]~dnorm(0,10); 
} 
 
for (i in 1:161) 
{ 
 for (j in 1:161) 
{ 
for(m in 1:2) 
{ 
for(t in 2:7) 
{ 
       prob[i,j,1,m,t] <- (exp(alpha[i,t]))/(exp(alpha[i,t]) + exp(alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home) + exp(tie 
+ (alpha[i,t] + alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
       prob[i,j,2,m,t] <- (exp(alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home))/(exp(alpha[i,t]) + exp(alpha[j,t] + (m-
1)*home) + exp(tie + (alpha[i,t] + alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
       prob[i,j,3,m,t] <- (exp(tie + (alpha[i,t] + alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home)/2))/(exp(alpha[i,t]) + 
exp(alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home) + exp(tie + (alpha[i,t] + alpha[j,t] + (m-1)*home)/2)); 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (n in 1:161) 
{ 
for (q in 1:161) 
{ 
  Y[n,q,1,1,1] <- WNO1[n,q]+WNF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,1,2] <- WNO2[n,q]+WNF2[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,1,3] <- WNO3[n,q]+WNF3[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,1,4] <- WNO4[n,q]+WNF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,1,5] <- WNO5[n,q]+WNF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,1,6] <- WNO6[n,q]+WNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,1] <- WHO1[n,q]+WHF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,2] <- WHO2[n,q]+WHF2[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,3] <- WHO3[n,q]+WHF3[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,4] <- WHO4[n,q]+WHF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,5] <- WHO5[n,q]+WHF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,1,2,6] <- WHO6[n,q]+WHF6[n,q];   
  Y[n,q,2,1,1] <- LNO1[n,q]+LNF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,1,2] <- LNO2[n,q]+LNF2[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,1,3] <- LNO3[n,q]+LNF3[n,q]; 
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  Y[n,q,2,1,4] <- LNO4[n,q]+LNF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,1,5] <- LNO5[n,q]+LNF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,1,6] <- LNO6[n,q]+LNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,1] <- LHO1[n,q]+LHF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,2] <- LHO2[n,q]+LHF2[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,3] <- LHO3[n,q]+LHF3[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,4] <- LHO4[n,q]+LHF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,5] <- LHO5[n,q]+LHF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,2,2,6] <- LHO6[n,q]+LHF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,1] <- TNO1[n,q]+TNF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,2] <- TNO2[n,q]+TNF2[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,3] <- TNO3[n,q]+TNF3[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,4] <- TNO4[n,q]+TNF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,5] <- TNO5[n,q]+TNF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,1,6] <- TNO6[n,q]+TNF6[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,2,1] <- THO1[n,q]+THF1[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,2,2] <- THO2[n,q]+THF2[n,q];   
  Y[n,q,3,2,3] <- THO3[n,q]+THF3[n,q];   
  Y[n,q,3,2,4] <- THO4[n,q]+THF4[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,2,5] <- THO5[n,q]+THF5[n,q]; 
  Y[n,q,3,2,6] <- THO6[n,q]+THF6[n,q]; 
} 
} 
 
for (v in 1:161) 
{ 
for(w in 1:161) 
{ 
for (n in 1:2) 
{ 
for (t in 2:7) 
{ 
N[v,w,n,t] <- Y[v,w,1,n,t-1] + Y[v,w,2,n,t-1] + Y[v,w,3,n,t-1]; 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (d in 1:161) 
{ 
for (f in 1:161) 
{ 
for (g in 1:3) 
{ 
for(h in 1:2) 
{ 
for(t in 2:7) 
{ 
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mu[d,f,g,h,t] <- N[d,f,h,t]*prob[d,f,g,h,t]; 
Y[d,f,g,h,t-1] ~ dpois(mu[d,f,g,h,t]); 
} 
}  
 
} 
} 
} 
 
for (m in 1:160) 
{ 
for (n in 2:7) 
{  
alpha[m,n]~dnorm(alpha[m,n-1], 10) 
} 
} 
 
for (p in 2:7) 
{ 
alpha[161,p]<-0; 
} 
 
home ~ dnorm(0, .0001); 
tie ~ dnorm(0,.0001); 
} 
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Appendix C – Full Rankings 
 
 C.1 – Full Rankings for Extended Bradley Terry Model with Ties, 
Neutral Site Distinction, and Game Type 
 
Rank Team  mean  sd 
 MC 
error 2.50% median 97.50% 
1 Brazil 1.089 0.1999 0.006202 0.6789 1.09 1.483 
2 France 0.8148 0.2441 0.007059 0.3465 0.8089 1.296 
3 Mexico 0.8144 0.194 0.006292 0.4426 0.8118 1.198 
4 Argentina 0.7352 0.2178 0.005623 0.3227 0.7414 1.171 
5 Italy 0.6861 0.24 0.006852 0.2124 0.6909 1.164 
6 Spain 0.649 0.2426 0.00734 0.164 0.651 1.126 
7 Netherlands 0.6322 0.2536 0.00673 0.1239 0.6309 1.137 
8 Germany 0.6086 0.2328 0.005635 0.1596 0.6053 1.065 
9 Japan 0.6061 0.2346 0.007058 0.1285 0.6108 1.062 
10 Australia 0.6012 0.2497 0.00708 0.1099 0.6062 1.113 
11 England 0.5496 0.2498 0.006883 0.07462 0.554 1.029 
12 Nigeria 0.5333 0.2225 0.006333 0.09634 0.5345 0.9587 
13 USA 0.5282 0.2004 0.006123 0.1322 0.5228 0.9041 
14 Iran 0.511 0.233 0.005962 0.06543 0.5117 0.9735 
15 Denmark 0.5109 0.2421 0.007154 0.03662 0.5134 0.9882 
16 Sweden 0.5058 0.245 0.007748 0.01239 0.4966 0.9954 
17 Croatia 0.474 0.2455 0.007788 -0.00196 0.4697 0.942 
18 Costa Rica 0.4654 0.2137 0.005693 0.05305 0.4684 0.8862 
19 Czech Republic 0.4652 0.2482 0.008242 -0.02944 0.4576 0.9682 
20 Portugal 0.4651 0.2531 0.006133 -0.04178 0.4652 0.9451 
21 Cameroon 0.4008 0.2373 0.007182 -0.05814 0.4048 0.8856 
22 South Africa 0.3977 0.2301 0.006502 -0.05095 0.3995 0.8432 
23 Morocco 0.3701 0.2383 0.005775 -0.1049 0.3714 0.854 
24 Ireland 0.3409 0.2597 0.008056 -0.1769 0.3362 0.87 
25 Senegal 0.2989 0.2417 0.007711 -0.1711 0.3029 0.7559 
26 Egypt 0.2761 0.2398 0.006993 -0.1901 0.2897 0.7238 
27 Colombia 0.2727 0.2134 0.005958 -0.149 0.271 0.697 
28 Turkey 0.2713 0.242 0.006474 -0.2059 0.2673 0.7578 
29 China PR 0.2681 0.2437 0.006782 -0.2074 0.2687 0.7637 
30 Bahrain 0.2628 0.2521 0.008505 -0.2223 0.2694 0.7528 
31 Honduras 0.2621 0.2321 0.006303 -0.1915 0.2517 0.726 
32 Saudi Arabia 0.2517 0.2146 0.006574 -0.1795 0.2525 0.6625 
33 Uzbekistan 0.2495 0.2613 0.006515 -0.2771 0.2595 0.7521 
34 Belgium 0.2393 0.2488 0.007753 -0.2426 0.2394 0.7376 
35 Jordan 0.2362 0.2775 0.007832 -0.2943 0.22 0.747 
36 Cote d'Ivoire 0.2294 0.2455 0.007065 -0.2522 0.2223 0.7161 
37 New Zealand 0.2276 0.2483 0.006325 -0.2537 0.227 0.7053 
38 Romania 0.2264 0.2466 0.00628 -0.2558 0.2264 0.6896 
39 Uruguay 0.2134 0.2178 0.005792 -0.2224 0.2104 0.6493 
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40 Zambia 0.2117 0.2383 0.006765 -0.2519 0.2025 0.6703 
41 Guinea 0.1996 0.2778 0.008926 -0.3368 0.2005 0.7328 
42 Jamaica 0.183 0.228 0.006867 -0.2349 0.1792 0.6464 
43 Cuba 0.1806 0.2534 0.007062 -0.3474 0.1777 0.674 
44 Bulgaria 0.1774 0.254 0.007796 -0.3135 0.1742 0.6774 
45 Paraguay 0.1722 0.2299 0.007791 -0.2646 0.1692 0.6292 
46 Poland 0.1702 0.2527 0.007542 -0.3328 0.1808 0.6374 
47 Kuwait 0.1662 0.2527 0.007238 -0.3221 0.1721 0.6307 
48 Serb. and Mont. 0.1662 0.2884 0.007919 -0.3963 0.1745 0.7293 
49 Greece 0.1631 0.2672 0.00682 -0.3788 0.1618 0.6931 
50 Trin. and Tob. 0.1601 0.2218 0.007279 -0.2741 0.1661 0.6092 
51 Ghana 0.1463 0.2504 0.007033 -0.3549 0.1487 0.6126 
52 Angola 0.1426 0.2665 0.008572 -0.3961 0.1398 0.6475 
53 Korea Rep. 0.1411 0.2296 0.006075 -0.3104 0.1357 0.5847 
54 Scotland 0.1236 0.2713 0.008528 -0.4141 0.117 0.6252 
55 Russia 0.1215 0.2512 0.007545 -0.3835 0.1265 0.624 
56 Tunisia 0.1054 0.2287 0.006695 -0.349 0.1061 0.5471 
57 Oman 0.08357 0.2722 0.008554 -0.4511 0.07664 0.6255 
58 Guatemala 0.07478 0.2438 0.007891 -0.4169 0.08134 0.5638 
59 Qatar 0.064 0.2523 0.008754 -0.4562 0.07614 0.5365 
60 Haiti 0.06088 0.2592 0.008472 -0.4416 0.06031 0.5859 
61 Fiji 0.05986 0.2665 0.007763 -0.4533 0.06697 0.6026 
62 Israel 0.05212 0.2702 0.008198 -0.4616 0.05226 0.5929 
63 Norway 0.05175 0.2524 0.00685 -0.4142 0.03948 0.5587 
64 Finland 0.047 0.2813 0.007666 -0.4903 0.04181 0.5858 
65 Slovenia 0.04691 0.2476 0.00745 -0.4386 0.05729 0.517 
66 Solomon Islands 0.04114 0.2697 0.008438 -0.464 0.03651 0.5632 
67 Togo 0.03713 0.2625 0.007424 -0.4952 0.03557 0.5263 
68 Tahiti 0.02419 0.2688 0.007261 -0.489 0.0163 0.5656 
69 Ecuador 0.01729 0.2323 0.006878 -0.4213 0.02168 0.4929 
70 Canada 0.01435 0.2494 0.006966 -0.4848 0.01799 0.4986 
71 Iraq 0.003045 0.2656 0.006919 -0.5358 0.003737 0.5294 
72 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 
73 Slovakia -0.00884 0.281 0.008589 -0.5536 0.005442 0.5504 
74 Bosnia-Herz -0.00942 0.2765 0.007925 -0.5568 -0.01377 0.5487 
75 Congo DR -0.01405 0.2398 0.007242 -0.4871 -0.00581 0.4468 
76 St. Lucia -0.01434 0.2811 0.007588 -0.5749 -0.0057 0.5587 
77 Unit. Arab Emir. -0.02007 0.2431 0.006117 -0.4835 -0.01917 0.4262 
78 Liberia -0.0493 0.2683 0.008422 -0.579 -0.04702 0.4639 
79 Austria -0.05068 0.2764 0.008361 -0.5661 -0.04882 0.4882 
80 Turkmenistan -0.0509 0.2796 0.007843 -0.5857 -0.04826 0.4851 
81 Kenya -0.0536 0.2778 0.007864 -0.6137 -0.05717 0.4938 
82 Kyrgyzstan -0.05893 0.3112 0.009324 -0.6674 -0.0621 0.5446 
83 Switzerland -0.06175 0.2743 0.007967 -0.5879 -0.06033 0.486 
84 St. Vin. &Gren. -0.07126 0.2699 0.00704 -0.6294 -0.06236 0.4481 
85 Namibia -0.07904 0.3003 0.008584 -0.6697 -0.08365 0.4963 
86 Guam -0.07909 0.3192 0.01055 -0.7184 -0.07896 0.5536 
87 Belarus -0.08249 0.2762 0.00713 -0.638 -0.08105 0.4642 
88 Latvia -0.1038 0.2751 0.007835 -0.6459 -0.09822 0.4224 
89 Syria -0.1075 0.2835 0.007293 -0.6803 -0.1155 0.4276 
90 Dominica -0.11 0.2955 0.008629 -0.7294 -0.09961 0.4574 
91 Wales -0.1132 0.2755 0.007954 -0.6633 -0.1082 0.4215 
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92 Hungary -0.1143 0.2634 0.006818 -0.6205 -0.1099 0.409 
93 Rwanda -0.1203 0.2872 0.009016 -0.6827 -0.1276 0.4458 
94 New Caledonia -0.1208 0.2919 0.008581 -0.6798 -0.1108 0.4768 
95 Mali -0.1209 0.2677 0.008004 -0.6706 -0.1195 0.3864 
96 El Salvador -0.123 0.2589 0.007099 -0.6371 -0.112 0.3561 
97 Peru -0.123 0.2277 0.006672 -0.5798 -0.1196 0.3137 
98 Gambia -0.1238 0.2929 0.008051 -0.7052 -0.1131 0.4589 
99 Cape Verde Isl. -0.125 0.2894 0.007528 -0.6886 -0.1239 0.4397 
100 Pap. New Guin. -0.1307 0.2885 0.008553 -0.6902 -0.1369 0.4429 
101 Netherlands Ant. -0.1389 0.2991 0.00829 -0.7053 -0.1457 0.4507 
102 Swaziland -0.1441 0.2708 0.007409 -0.6784 -0.1367 0.3952 
103 Georgia -0.1465 0.2844 0.00784 -0.7075 -0.1577 0.3973 
104 Lebanon -0.1657 0.2727 0.00733 -0.694 -0.1636 0.3778 
105 Libya -0.1664 0.2685 0.008809 -0.6629 -0.1637 0.3641 
106 Korea DPR -0.175 0.2798 0.009436 -0.728 -0.179 0.3844 
107 Gabon -0.1835 0.2778 0.007689 -0.7427 -0.183 0.338 
108 St. Kitts & Nev. -0.1842 0.2819 0.007793 -0.7452 -0.1954 0.3581 
109 Bahamas -0.1868 0.3056 0.00852 -0.8121 -0.1811 0.4041 
110 Myanmar -0.1877 0.2906 0.008272 -0.7456 -0.1958 0.4153 
111 Surinam -0.1877 0.2927 0.009564 -0.7494 -0.1891 0.3775 
112 Madagascar -0.1887 0.2743 0.008058 -0.733 -0.1806 0.332 
113 Iceland -0.1897 0.268 0.007452 -0.7191 -0.211 0.3529 
114 Armenia -0.2019 0.2689 0.007617 -0.7353 -0.1966 0.3282 
115 Estonia -0.2044 0.2786 0.008039 -0.782 -0.1983 0.3505 
116 Vanuatu -0.2131 0.2587 0.008096 -0.7206 -0.2191 0.2916 
117 Lesotho -0.2151 0.2954 0.00824 -0.8124 -0.2228 0.3487 
118 Kazakhstan -0.2244 0.2916 0.00867 -0.8258 -0.2264 0.348 
119 Indonesia -0.2278 0.2721 0.006797 -0.7567 -0.2099 0.2976 
120 Panama -0.2311 0.2545 0.008173 -0.7454 -0.2268 0.2647 
121 India -0.235 0.283 0.008153 -0.7867 -0.2371 0.3217 
122 Dominican Rep. -0.2462 0.2995 0.008943 -0.8186 -0.2475 0.344 
123 Vietnam -0.248 0.2808 0.008504 -0.8014 -0.2454 0.3029 
124 Congo -0.249 0.2623 0.0097 -0.7613 -0.2435 0.2505 
125 Botswana -0.2516 0.2851 0.007976 -0.792 -0.2577 0.3003 
126 Sierra Leone -0.2563 0.2787 0.008899 -0.7994 -0.2599 0.2843 
127 Northern Ireland -0.2649 0.2677 0.008292 -0.7935 -0.2654 0.28 
128 Albania -0.2661 0.2761 0.007923 -0.8053 -0.2649 0.2765 
129 Algeria -0.2714 0.2589 0.007273 -0.7676 -0.2676 0.2486 
130 Barbados -0.2725 0.2736 0.007745 -0.8071 -0.2752 0.2777 
131 Bolivia -0.2786 0.2354 0.007018 -0.7337 -0.2786 0.1879 
132 Lithuania -0.2839 0.2766 0.007393 -0.8262 -0.2814 0.2861 
133 Thailand -0.308 0.2521 0.008775 -0.7959 -0.2994 0.181 
134 Malawi -0.3088 0.2897 0.008249 -0.8954 -0.3134 0.2752 
135 Mozambique -0.3204 0.2854 0.008001 -0.8661 -0.3316 0.2488 
136 British Virgin Isl. -0.3246 0.3019 0.007946 -0.9321 -0.3219 0.2613 
137 Yemen -0.3264 0.2808 0.008934 -0.8965 -0.3204 0.2073 
138 Malaysia -0.3294 0.2844 0.007334 -0.8727 -0.3207 0.235 
139 Cyprus -0.3352 0.2777 0.008002 -0.8876 -0.3409 0.2035 
140 Moldova -0.3353 0.2723 0.007991 -0.8545 -0.3421 0.1938 
141 Sudan -0.3386 0.2748 0.008081 -0.8799 -0.3332 0.2366 
142 Chile -0.3586 0.234 0.007271 -0.8496 -0.3598 0.09612 
143 Cook Islands -0.3598 0.286 0.007469 -0.9066 -0.3618 0.2243 
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144 Burkina Faso -0.3758 0.2458 0.00724 -0.8414 -0.3717 0.08878 
145 US Virgin Isl. -0.396 0.2923 0.009389 -0.9742 -0.3997 0.2016 
146 Samoa -0.4139 0.2952 0.009102 -0.9793 -0.4063 0.1852 
147 Palestine -0.4153 0.2807 0.007981 -0.9678 -0.4219 0.1517 
148 Azerbaijan -0.4311 0.2821 0.008614 -0.9654 -0.4435 0.1535 
149 Grenada -0.4362 0.29 0.00732 -1.002 -0.4353 0.1431 
150 Singapore -0.4438 0.288 0.006808 -1.014 -0.4401 0.1233 
151 Nicaragua -0.4867 0.2773 0.007109 -1.028 -0.4924 0.07125 
152 Venezuela -0.548 0.2532 0.007148 -1.029 -0.5632 -0.05385 
153 Maldives -0.5594 0.2811 0.008458 -1.101 -0.5654 -0.01052 
154 Liechtenstein -0.6114 0.2728 0.007044 -1.126 -0.6189 -0.06118 
155 San Marino -0.7049 0.2716 0.008084 -1.242 -0.7066 -0.1942 
156 Malta -0.7097 0.2824 0.007813 -1.284 -0.7108 -0.1521 
157 Andorra -0.7312 0.2734 0.006823 -1.28 -0.74 -0.2219 
158 Luxembourg -0.8362 0.2735 0.008511 -1.354 -0.8386 -0.2855 
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C.2 – Full Rankings for Dynamic Bradley Terry Model with Ties and 
Neutral Site Distinction 
 
 
Rank Team  mean  sd 
 MC 
error 2.50% median 97.50% 
1 Mexico 2.472 0.5546 0.01333 1.412 2.467 3.561 
2 Argentina 2.312 0.5566 0.01374 1.206 2.309 3.405 
3 Brazil 2.276 0.498 0.01209 1.304 2.276 3.251 
4 England 2.132 0.5846 0.01356 1.006 2.112 3.32 
5 France 2.08 0.5577 0.01153 0.9793 2.074 3.159 
6 Spain 2.072 0.5839 0.01223 0.9292 2.06 3.229 
7 Japan 2.068 0.5247 0.01128 1.032 2.069 3.103 
8 Iran 1.99 0.5755 0.01275 0.8678 1.991 3.135 
9 Czech Republic 1.983 0.5718 0.0134 0.862 1.982 3.117 
10 Italy 1.872 0.5787 0.01489 0.7452 1.873 3.048 
11 Nigeria 1.838 0.5627 0.01106 0.7805 1.823 2.955 
12 USA 1.814 0.5215 0.01182 0.8271 1.807 2.869 
13 Sweden 1.734 0.5628 0.01301 0.6592 1.736 2.85 
14 Ireland 1.716 0.5872 0.01469 0.5282 1.724 2.866 
15 Netherlands 1.713 0.609 0.01246 0.5349 1.708 2.935 
16 Greece 1.681 0.5619 0.01251 0.5978 1.683 2.778 
17 Germany 1.675 0.5981 0.01338 0.5006 1.686 2.851 
18 Denmark 1.585 0.5487 0.01146 0.5503 1.575 2.68 
19 Croatia 1.531 0.5785 0.01244 0.4188 1.525 2.695 
20 Turkey 1.413 0.5513 0.01159 0.3223 1.405 2.501 
21 Cote d'Ivoire 1.409 0.6751 0.01571 0.1045 1.409 2.739 
22 Norway 1.272 0.5966 0.0126 0.1035 1.267 2.469 
23 Senegal 1.255 0.5601 0.01388 0.1546 1.261 2.369 
24 Morocco 1.231 0.5597 0.009774 0.1566 1.218 2.349 
25 Romania 1.205 0.6504 0.01484 -0.05292 1.196 2.504 
26 Costa Rica 1.192 0.5012 0.01031 0.1965 1.191 2.187 
27 Colombia 1.174 0.5149 0.009978 0.1928 1.168 2.179 
28 Portugal 1.154 0.5904 0.01176 0.02909 1.161 2.324 
29 Uzbekistan 1.114 0.6371 0.01474 -0.11 1.108 2.407 
30 Angola 1.072 0.6284 0.01377 -0.1435 1.065 2.282 
31 Australia 1.066 0.6374 0.01385 -0.1734 1.054 2.349 
32 Cameroon 1.04 0.5932 0.01577 -0.1274 1.045 2.188 
33 Saudi Arabia 1.031 0.5767 0.01165 -0.09746 1.032 2.135 
34 China PR 1.018 0.5438 0.01205 7.42E-04 1.01 2.106 
35 Jamaica 0.9862 0.5236 0.01261 -0.02169 0.978 2.027 
36 Solomon Islands 0.9643 0.6767 0.01404 -0.3572 0.955 2.321 
37 Poland 0.9257 0.5725 0.01296 -0.2001 0.936 2.046 
38 Paraguay 0.9123 0.5807 0.01246 -0.2027 0.9062 2.05 
39 Guatemala 0.8763 0.5112 0.01209 -0.1512 0.8781 1.879 
40 Uruguay 0.8676 0.5575 0.01348 -0.2287 0.8697 1.93 
41 Jordan 0.8379 0.5114 0.009052 -0.1576 0.8391 1.873 
42 Korea Rep. 0.8138 0.5281 0.01017 -0.2209 0.8163 1.836 
43 Cuba 0.8005 0.6301 0.01424 -0.4231 0.7981 2.026 
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44 Bosnia-Herz. 0.7259 0.7147 0.01509 -0.7063 0.7304 2.12 
45 Bulgaria 0.7255 0.606 0.01321 -0.4561 0.7342 1.925 
46 Bahrain 0.7217 0.4841 0.01143 -0.1913 0.7169 1.667 
47 Honduras 0.6977 0.5009 0.01208 -0.2839 0.698 1.677 
48 Serbia and Mont. 0.6873 0.6536 0.01272 -0.5888 0.6905 2.017 
49 Guinea 0.6857 0.611 0.0121 -0.4789 0.6806 1.883 
50 Egypt 0.6447 0.5699 0.0125 -0.4363 0.621 1.814 
51 New Zealand 0.6395 0.7031 0.01813 -0.7062 0.6355 2.054 
52 Russia 0.6253 0.5908 0.01308 -0.534 0.6263 1.81 
53 Togo 0.5557 0.6652 0.01801 -0.7288 0.5375 1.874 
54 Zambia 0.5142 0.6295 0.01208 -0.6969 0.5094 1.794 
55 Hungary 0.511 0.601 0.0116 -0.6728 0.5125 1.683 
56 Israel 0.4902 0.6424 0.01331 -0.7212 0.4813 1.728 
57 Wales 0.49 0.6175 0.01345 -0.715 0.4983 1.703 
58 Oman 0.4884 0.5605 0.01286 -0.5858 0.4843 1.58 
59 Belgium 0.4883 0.6248 0.01571 -0.7494 0.491 1.686 
60 Tunisia 0.4647 0.5608 0.01278 -0.6216 0.4591 1.54 
61 Belarus 0.4646 0.6375 0.01334 -0.759 0.4547 1.713 
62 South Africa 0.4572 0.6064 0.0135 -0.7474 0.4568 1.629 
63 Libya 0.4241 0.6272 0.0138 -0.7791 0.4182 1.637 
64 Ecuador 0.3819 0.5901 0.01386 -0.7674 0.3772 1.553 
65 Ghana 0.3768 0.6506 0.01344 -0.9155 0.3768 1.644 
66 Tahiti 0.2155 0.6989 0.01566 -1.143 0.212 1.603 
67 Canada 0.1615 0.6406 0.0137 -1.091 0.1726 1.396 
68 Panama 0.1135 0.5301 0.01086 -0.9496 0.1086 1.164 
69 Peru 0.09667 0.5847 0.01575 -1.087 0.1089 1.179 
70 Qatar 0.09286 0.5346 0.01199 -0.9456 0.09453 1.162 
71 Mali 0.09178 0.5547 0.01116 -1.003 0.09281 1.172 
72 Switzerland 0.08194 0.6196 0.01355 -1.144 0.08916 1.281 
73 Chile 0.0664 0.6108 0.01497 -1.155 0.07265 1.244 
74 Finland 0.0589 0.6342 0.01322 -1.171 0.06074 1.332 
75 Scotland 0.04652 0.6061 0.01306 -1.145 0.04593 1.234 
76 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 
77 Iraq -0.00557 0.5542 0.0115 -1.106 -8.45E-04 1.068 
78 Haiti -0.03306 0.5734 0.01394 -1.144 -0.03289 1.108 
79 Trin. and Tobago -0.04713 0.4835 0.01123 -0.9787 -0.04194 0.9029 
80 Kuwait -0.06396 0.5376 0.01091 -1.123 -0.06513 0.9575 
81 Austria -0.08772 0.6416 0.01373 -1.387 -0.07908 1.132 
82 Slovenia -0.09495 0.5938 0.01316 -1.275 -0.08144 1.065 
83 Syria -0.1211 0.572 0.01168 -1.237 -0.1099 0.9726 
84 Fiji -0.1378 0.7279 0.01544 -1.575 -0.1259 1.271 
85 Venezuela -0.1447 0.581 0.0131 -1.293 -0.1351 0.9987 
86 Congo DR -0.157 0.5797 0.01177 -1.323 -0.1526 0.9754 
87 Kyrgyzstan -0.1754 0.8293 0.02104 -1.805 -0.1761 1.446 
88 Albania -0.2019 0.6467 0.01537 -1.44 -0.1978 1.077 
89 Northern Ireland -0.2136 0.5969 0.01354 -1.403 -0.2006 0.9532 
90 Gabon -0.2251 0.6935 0.01571 -1.605 -0.2099 1.144 
91 Slovakia -0.2689 0.7163 0.01797 -1.685 -0.2585 1.125 
92 Gambia -0.3026 0.9302 0.02123 -2.141 -0.2921 1.547 
93 Kenya -0.3034 0.6279 0.01389 -1.547 -0.3003 0.912 
94 Congo -0.3158 0.6962 0.01589 -1.686 -0.316 1.026 
95 Guam -0.3491 1.134 0.02402 -2.598 -0.3615 1.891 
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96 Bolivia -0.3532 0.6376 0.01338 -1.612 -0.3419 0.8924 
97 Latvia -0.4079 0.5469 0.01005 -1.481 -0.4126 0.6641 
98 Vanuatu -0.4127 0.6566 0.01315 -1.674 -0.4206 0.9053 
99 Liberia -0.4363 0.7021 0.01672 -1.852 -0.4312 0.8744 
100 St. Vint. & Gren. -0.4401 0.63 0.01408 -1.694 -0.4333 0.805 
101 United Arab Emir. -0.4444 0.5565 0.01232 -1.541 -0.4458 0.623 
102 Turkmenistan -0.4707 0.6452 0.0154 -1.737 -0.4681 0.7972 
103 Armenia -0.5083 0.6598 0.0147 -1.794 -0.4958 0.7399 
104 Netherlands Ant. -0.5269 0.8463 0.0186 -2.13 -0.5442 1.164 
105 New Caledonia -0.5316 0.8743 0.01991 -2.211 -0.5362 1.186 
106 Pap. New Guinea -0.5386 0.8595 0.02249 -2.237 -0.5518 1.153 
107 Namibia -0.5561 1.013 0.02743 -2.489 -0.5726 1.412 
108 Lebanon -0.557 0.6114 0.01376 -1.759 -0.5605 0.6503 
109 Korea DPR -0.5573 0.6733 0.01262 -1.885 -0.5556 0.755 
110 Rwanda -0.5735 0.6903 0.01651 -1.935 -0.5721 0.7806 
111 Burkina Faso -0.5971 0.5959 0.01303 -1.778 -0.5991 0.5744 
112 Iceland -0.6676 0.6536 0.01465 -1.952 -0.6645 0.605 
113 Cape Verde Isl. -0.6926 0.7329 0.01782 -2.165 -0.6782 0.7256 
114 Indonesia -0.7033 0.6096 0.01351 -1.891 -0.7202 0.5055 
115 El Salvador -0.7399 0.5712 0.01373 -1.857 -0.7408 0.3508 
116 Algeria -0.7459 0.6041 0.01241 -1.964 -0.7405 0.4504 
117 Sierra Leone -0.7513 0.8561 0.01932 -2.429 -0.7516 0.9328 
118 Botswana -0.7649 0.6513 0.01335 -2.061 -0.7523 0.4791 
119 Swaziland -0.7861 0.6987 0.01594 -2.177 -0.7762 0.5754 
120 Mozambique -0.7868 0.6916 0.01361 -2.185 -0.7802 0.5616 
121 Azerbaijan -0.8089 0.6349 0.01659 -2.057 -0.7918 0.4108 
122 St. Lucia -0.8199 0.6628 0.01399 -2.145 -0.8194 0.4859 
123 Dominica -0.8247 0.7741 0.01738 -2.319 -0.8257 0.7103 
124 Lithuania -0.8363 0.7157 0.01444 -2.244 -0.8287 0.51 
125 Estonia -0.8536 0.584 0.01188 -1.984 -0.8621 0.285 
126 Cyprus -0.8937 0.6526 0.01369 -2.193 -0.8935 0.381 
127 Moldova -0.92 0.619 0.01417 -2.132 -0.9152 0.2766 
128 Thailand -0.9247 0.5917 0.01234 -2.08 -0.9254 0.2167 
129 Madagascar -0.9431 0.8829 0.02176 -2.665 -0.9421 0.8149 
130 St. Kitts and Nev. -0.9681 0.605 0.01504 -2.145 -0.9686 0.2249 
131 Georgia -1.014 0.6823 0.01469 -2.393 -1.001 0.2804 
132 Lesotho -1.017 0.8828 0.02452 -2.738 -1.031 0.7233 
133 Vietnam -1.032 0.7058 0.01633 -2.451 -1.023 0.3464 
134 India -1.098 0.7166 0.01571 -2.503 -1.088 0.2788 
135 Malawi -1.104 0.6598 0.01482 -2.401 -1.106 0.1573 
136 Cook Islands -1.161 0.8359 0.01906 -2.846 -1.164 0.4812 
137 Barbados -1.182 0.6661 0.01869 -2.521 -1.181 0.1066 
138 Surinam -1.188 0.7954 0.01734 -2.793 -1.183 0.3521 
139 Malaysia -1.208 0.6727 0.01451 -2.528 -1.198 0.1285 
140 Bahamas -1.377 0.9199 0.0228 -3.203 -1.366 0.4382 
141 Sudan -1.508 0.7293 0.01676 -2.937 -1.494 -0.08135 
142 Palestine -1.576 0.704 0.01615 -2.989 -1.568 -0.1992 
143 Nicaragua -1.614 0.7537 0.01547 -3.108 -1.592 -0.144 
144 Dominican Rep. -1.643 0.8766 0.02155 -3.411 -1.634 0.05599 
145 Myanmar -1.647 0.7901 0.01925 -3.232 -1.629 -0.09014 
146 Singapore -1.799 0.6807 0.01684 -3.177 -1.791 -0.5031 
147 Yemen -1.8 0.6145 0.01427 -3.022 -1.799 -0.613 
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148 Kazakhstan -1.816 0.8064 0.01818 -3.451 -1.819 -0.3091 
149 Grenada -1.874 0.7121 0.01623 -3.331 -1.87 -0.5047 
150 US Virgin Islands -2.153 0.794 0.01823 -3.732 -2.143 -0.6203 
151 Samoa -2.291 0.8337 0.01739 -3.951 -2.277 -0.6438 
152 British Virgin Isl. -2.336 0.7472 0.01667 -3.811 -2.336 -0.8712 
153 Malta -2.35 0.6978 0.01564 -3.766 -2.342 -1.038 
154 Maldives -2.423 0.7447 0.01669 -3.897 -2.422 -1.008 
155 Andorra -2.528 0.8126 0.019 -4.126 -2.517 -0.9451 
156 San Marino -2.568 0.7633 0.01839 -4.077 -2.554 -1.101 
157 Liechtenstein -2.653 0.7335 0.01616 -4.126 -2.639 -1.278 
158 Luxembourg -3.428 0.798 0.0188 -5.038 -3.406 -1.925 
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Appendix D – Non - Dynamic Model with Game Type Parameter 
 
D.1 – Posterior Trace – Top Twenty Teams 
 
 
 
Brazil
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
France
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
 
 
Mexico
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Argentina
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
 
 
Italy
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
  
Spain
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
 
 
Netherlands
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
  
Germany
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
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Japan
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Australia
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
 
 
England
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Nigeria
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
 
 
USA
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Iran
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
 
 
Denmark
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Sweden
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
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Croatia
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Costa Rica
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
 
 
Czech Republic
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -0.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
  
Portugal
iteration
4001 6000 8000 10000
   -1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
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D.2 – Smoothed Posterior Density (s = .15) – Top Twenty Teams 
 
Brazil
    0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
    3.0
  
France
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Mexico
    0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
    3.0
  
Argentina
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
 
 
Italy
   -1.0     0.0     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Spain
   -1.0     0.0     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Netherlands
   -1.0     0.0     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Germany
   -1.0     0.0     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Japan
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Australia
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
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England
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Nigeria
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
USA
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
    3.0
  
Iran
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Denmark
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    1.0
    2.0
  
Sweden
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Croatia
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Costa Rica
   -1.0    -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
 
 
Czech Republic
   -0.5     0.0     0.5     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
  
Portugal
   -1.0     0.0     1.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
    1.5
    2.0
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Appendix E – Dynamic Model 
 
E.1 – Posterior Trace – Top Twenty Teams 
 
  
Mexico: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
  
Argentina: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
 
 
Brazil: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
England: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
 
 
France: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
   15.0
  
Spain: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
 
 
Japan: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
  
Iran: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
 
 79 
 
 
 
Czech Republic: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
Italy: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
 
 
Nigeria: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
USA: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
 
 
Sweden: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
Ireland: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
 
 
Netherlands: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
    0.0
    5.0
   10.0
  
alpha[53,7]
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -2.0
    0.0
    2.0
    4.0
    6.0
    8.0
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Germany: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
Denmark: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -2.0
    0.0
    2.0
    4.0
    6.0
 
 
Croatia: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
  
Turkey: 2004
iteration
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
   -5.0
    0.0
    5.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
  
 
E.2 – Smoothed Posterior Density (s = .15) – Top Twenty Teams 
 
 
Mexico: 2004
    0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Argentina: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Brazil: 2004
    0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.5
    1.0
  
England: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
France: 2004
    0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Spain: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Japan: 2004
    0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Iran: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Czech Republic: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Italy: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
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Nigeria: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
USA: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Sweden: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Ireland: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Netherlands: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Greece: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Germany: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Denmark
   -2.0     0.0     2.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
 
 
Croatia: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0     4.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
  
Turkey: 2004
   -2.0     0.0     2.0
    0.0
    0.2
    0.4
    0.6
    0.8
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 E.3 – Team Parameter Strength vs. Time 
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Ghana
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gr eece
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gr enada
-2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Guam
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Guatemal a
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gui nea
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Hai t i
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Hondur as
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Hungar y
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
I cel and
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Indi a
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Indonesi a
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
I r an
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Ir aq
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
I r el and
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Is r ael
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
I tal y
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Jamai ca
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Japan
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Jor dan
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kazakhstan
-2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
K enya
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kor ea DPR
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kor ea Rep.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Kuwai t
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kyr gyzs tan
-0.2
-0.18
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Latvi a
-0.45
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Lebanon
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Lesotho
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Li ber i a
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Li bya
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Li echtenstei n
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Li thuani a
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Luxembour g
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M adagascar
-1
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M al awi
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
M al ays i a
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M al di ves
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M al i
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
M al ta
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M exi co
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M ol dova
-1
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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M or occo
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M ozambi que
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
M yanmar
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Nami bi a
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nether l ands Anti l l es
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nether l ands
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
New Cal edoni a
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
New Zeal and
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Ni car agua
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Ni ger i a
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nor ther n I r el and
-0.45
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Nor way
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Oman
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P al est i ne
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panama
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Papua New Gui nea
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P ar aguay
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P er u
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Pol and
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
P or tugal
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Qatar
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Romani a
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Russ i a
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Rwanda
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Saudi  Ar abi a
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Samoa
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
San M ar i no
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Scot l and
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Senegal
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Ser bi a and M ontenegr o
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Si er r a Leone
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Si ngapor e
-2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sl ovak i a
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Sl oveni a
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sol omon I s l ands
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
South Af r ica
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Spai n
0
0. 5
1
1. 5
2
2. 5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
St. Ki tts and Nevis
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
St. Lucia
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
St. Vincent and the Gr enadines
-0.5
-0.45
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sudan
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sur inam
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Swazi land
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sweden
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Swi tzer l and
-0. 1
-0.05
0
0.05
0. 1
0.15
0. 2
0.25
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Syr ia
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tahi ti
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Thai land
-1
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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T ogo
0
0. 1
0. 2
0. 3
0. 4
0. 5
0. 6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tr inidad and Tobago
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tunisia
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Tur key
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
T ur kmeni stan
-0. 5
-0.45
-0. 4
-0.35
-0. 3
-0.25
-0. 2
-0.15
-0. 1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Uni ted Ar ab Emir ates
-5.00E-01
-4.50E-01
-4.00E-01
-3.50E-01
-3.00E-01
-2.50E-01
-2.00E-01
-1.50E-01
-1.00E-01
-5.00E-02
0.00E+00
5.00E-02
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Ur uguay
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US Vi r gin Islands
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
USA
0
0. 2
0. 4
0. 6
0. 8
1
1. 2
1. 4
1. 6
1. 8
2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Uzbekistan
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Vanuatu
-0.45
-0.4
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Venezuela
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Vi etnam
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Wales
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Yemen
-2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Zambia
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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